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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE INDIGENT




In the world of legal services practice,' the decision to decline or
discontinue representation due to a conflict of interest results in a consequence
for the indigent client that is both extreme and unique.2 Unlike the client who
has sufficient financial resources to retain other counsel, the indigent legal
services client is unable to walk around the comer to the next available attorney
when there is a disqualifying conflict.3 Thus, a conflict of interest can place the
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article; and colleagues Dean and Professor James Alfini, Professor Rodolphe J.A. de Seife and
Professor Daniel Reynolds for their helpful comments on drafts of this project. This article was
written with support from a summer research grant provided by the Northern Illinois University
College of Law.
1. For the purposes of this article, the term legal services refers to any non-profit law
firm that provides free representation to indigent persons in matters other than criminal law. As
the choice of language connotes, offices funded, in whole, or in part, through the Legal Services
Corporation are the most obvious example and will serve for purposes of this article as the
model of the provider of free legal services to the indigent. 42 U.S.C. §§2996-29961 (1994)(establishing the Legal Services Corporation to provide funding for the provision of legal
assistance to indigent persons in civil matters). Nevertheless, the discussion herein is intended to
be equally applicable to all providers of free legal services to the indigent, not just to those
funded through the Legal Services Corporation.
2. As seen from the survey discussed herein infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text,
and attached as Appendix, the most common way that a conflict of interest question is raised in
legal services is by the legal services office itself declining to represent a client due to the
conflict. See app. infra, questions 16-25A, at 625-26 (ranking disqualification motions among
the least frequent occurrences when a conflict of interest is present). Motions to disqualify,
though often discussed by commentators, are a very infrequent occurrence in legal services
practice. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad
Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1987) (discussing attorney
disqualification because of prior representation of opposing party and concluding that such
disqualifications do not advance interests of the adversary system); Howard M. Liebman, The
Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U. L. REV.
996 (1979) (tracing the development of attorney disqualification); Harva Ruth Dockery, Motions
to Disqualify Counsel Representing an Interest Adverse to a Former Client, 57 TEX. L. REV.
726 (1979) (discussing and criticizing the criteria used by courts to determine whether attorney
disqualification is warranted when representation is undertaken that is adverse to the interest of a
former client).
3. See Marshall J. Breger, Disqualification for Conflicts of Interest and the Legal Aid
Attorney, 62 B.U. L. REV. 1115, 1123 (1982) ("Conflicted legal aid clients, however, are likely
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legal services client in the position that the only possible source of legal
representation is unavailable due to the ethical constraints of the legal
profession. In fact, the denial of representation due to a conflict of interest most
often results in a denial of any representation for the legal services client.4 No
other client is placed in a similar position by a conflict of interest.5
The gravity of this consequence might lead one to think that conflict of
interest principles should be applied differently in the legal services context; if
not because of the impact upon the client, then because the lack of economic
self-interest of the attorneys involved lessens the danger or incentive that the
client's interests will be compromised. Though a different approach to conflicts
of interest in legal services has been suggested by a few commentators 6 and
adopted by a handful of courts in the analogous context of representation of
indigent persons by public defenders,7 criticism of the concept in legal services
to go without legal assistance if a legal aid office cannot represent them, as significant
alternatives to legal aid and supplemental modes of legal representation for indigents exist in only
a few areas of the country.").
A perusal of THE 1993/1994 DIRECTORY OF LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER OFFICES IN
THE UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES (1993) indicates that for the vast majority of locations,
there is only one organization that provides free legal services to the indigent. There are,
however, some locations, such as large metropolitan areas, where there is both a legal services
office funded by the Legal Services Corporation and a separate office independent of the Legal
Services Corporation, or a legal clinic chartered by a law school that may provide free legal
services to the indigent. See, e.g., id. at 33-35 (listing for Chicago, eight branch offices of the
Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, which is funded by the Legal Services Corp.; several
non-LSC funded programs providing free legal services; and legal clinics at four law schools in
the city). In such locations, a person dependent upon a legal services or legal aid agency for
representation may have an option if a conflict of interest prevents a particular office from
providing representation to that person. Thus, in that situation, which the author asserts is the
exception to the rule, a conflict of interest may not necessarily mean a denial of any
representation.
4. See app. infra, question 23, at 626 (going without representation is the most frequent
consequence for the conflicted legal services client).
See, e.g., Robert H. Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807, 856-57
(1977) (discussing the serious consequence to the legal services client when representation can
not proceed due to a conflict of interest); Thomas Jessee Goff, LegalAid Divorce Representation
and Conflict of Interest, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 294, 303 (1973) (discussing in the context of a
divorce action that the effect on a legal services client when a conflict of interest exists can be the
elimination of any legal assistance for one of the parties).
5. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text (discussing the availability of
alternative counsel for the indigent client of a public defender who has a disqualifying conflict of
interest).
6. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1397-1413 (1981) (calling for a reexamination of conflict of interest
rules as applied to legal services for the indigent in order to avoid the consequence of "the legal
profession ... purchasing its ethical integrity at the expense of equal justice." Id. at 1400);
Aronson, supra note 4, at 807, 855-56, 857 n.228 (1977) (calling for a relaxed approach to
vicarious disqualification of legal services attorneys).
7. See, e.g., People v. Wilkins, 268 N.E.2d 756, 757-58 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that
the rationale for the vicarious disqualification rule was inapplicable to a large scale legal services
program with many offices throughout New York city); see also infra note 145 (listing an




practice has carried the day,8 and most courts have rejected it.9 Two principles
have prevailed in rejecting a different application for conflict principles in the
legal services context. The first is that the practice of law is a single profession
to which ethical constraints must be applied in a uniform fashion to all kinds of
practice, and the second is that a different application of conflict principles
would subject indigent persons to legal representation that is "second-rate." 10
In order to revisit the application of conflict of interest principles to legal
services practice, this article employs a survey of legal services providers. In
addition to setting a context for discussion by determining the nature of the
conflicts most frequently encountered by legal services offices, the survey
resulted in two significant findings. First, the legal services client who is denied
representation due to a conflict of interest most often is left without any source
of representation." Second, the conflicts that most frequently lead to the denial
of representation of the indigent client often do not involve any actual prejudice
to the client.12
Building upon the findings of the survey, this article argues that the
presumption of prejudice inherent in conflict principles serves to unnecessarily
deny the legal services client access to the only available source of
representation. It examines and compares the interests involved in the legal
services attorney-client relationship to that involved in the for-profit attorney-
client relationship. That examination shows that the lack of pecuniary interests
of the legal services attorney, when coupled with the unique interest of the legal
services client in representation from the only available source, makes the
presumptions of prejudice necessary for the protection of the for-profit client
unnecessary and therefore inappropriate to the legal services attorney-client
relationship. Consequently, this article argues that, in the legal services context,
the application of conflict of interest principles should be based upon a standard
of actual prejudice rather than on the present presumption of prejudice
standard.
This article also will address the arguments of courts and commentators
who have claimed that a different application of conflict of interest principles in
legal services would result in an unacceptable compromise of client interests.
By exploring examples from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, this
8. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 3 (writing at the Heritage Foundation and rejecting all
suggestions that the legal services attorney may provide representation in light of a conflict of
interest that would prevent a private attorney from doing so and therefore proposing a "judicare
option" for conflicted indigent clients).
9. See, e.g., Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89, 90-91 (D.C. 1971) (rejecting the
argument that the peculiar nature of legal services practice, including the lack of pecuniary
interests, warranted relaxing the vicarious disqualification rule), overruled in part on other
grounds, In re Estate of Tran Van Chuong, 623 A.2d 1154 (D.C. 1993).
See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1233
(1972) (discussing the impropriety of a legal services office representing both individual Native
Americans and their tribe due to the possibility of later divergent interests).
But see Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 896-7 (Alaska 1979) (discussing ways that
attorneys from one legal services office could represent adverse parties in a child custody case
consistent with established standards of professional ethics).
10. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 3, at 1127-31 (1982) (arguing that legal aid attorneys
should be subject to the same ethical obligations as the rest of the profession in order to ensure
no downgrading in the quality of legal services to indigent clients).
11. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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article demonstrates that the risks to the interests of the legal services client in
shifting conflict application to an actual prejudice standard are no greater than
those to which the for-profit client is exposed in order to accommodate
interests of free choice of counsel and attorney mobility. An indigent client's
interest in representation from the "last lawyer in town" must certainly equal
the interests of free choice of counsel and attorney mobility. Similar
accommodation of the interests of the indigent client in obtaining representation
from the only available source is then seen not to result in an attorney-client
relationship that is second-class in terms of protecting client interests.
The difficulty with the utilization of an actual prejudice conflict standard
is how to properly determine when such prejudice is present and how to make
that determination without compromising client confidences sought to be
protected. Therefore, this article makes specific proposals for approaching
conflict situations in legal services and proposes a mechanism for making
determinations of actual prejudice.
I. WHY EVEN THINK ABOUT A DIFFERENT APPLICATION
OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR LEGAL SERVICES?
At the outset, it should be considered what, if anything, would be gained
by a different application of conflict principles in the legal services context so
as to allow representation in situations where representation by the for-profit
attorney would be prohibited. Though some indigent persons are denied the
opportunity for legal services representation because of conflicts of interest, the
demand for legal services for the indigent greatly exceeds the supply.13
Assuming present maximum utilization of resources, providing representation
for the conflicted client merely would displace the representation of another
client. Therefore, a different application of conflict principles for legal
services, one that would allow for representation for an indigent client who
would otherwise not be represented due to a conflict, would not result in a
greater total number of indigent persons receiving representation. Why then
should established principles of professional responsibility be applied
differently if nothing is gained in terms of the number persons who are able to
obtain free legal services? Would applying conflict of interest principles in a
different fashion for legal services be a compromise of the standards of the
profession for a Pyrrhic Victory, if a victory at all?14 What would be gained is
13. See Developments in the Law-Conflict of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note
6, at 1397-1400 (discussing the limited availability of legal services for the poor); FINDINGS OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 18, 37 (Institute for Survey Research at Temple
University ed., 1994) (reporting that during 1992, though 47% of low-income households
experienced a new or ongoing legal need, only 23% of those households had contact with the
judicial system that most often would have involved the assistance of a lawyer); ILLINOIS LEGAL
NEEDS STUDY 133 (1989) (finding that 80% of the need of poor persons for civil legal services
is unmet on an annual basis); Two NATIONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENTS OF THE
UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR AND OF THE PUBLIC GENERALLY 37 (1989) (concluding
that 80% of poor persons nationwide had a legal problem for which they had no legal help).
14. Critics of a different application of conflict principles in the legal services context
have based their opposition, in most part, upon the notion that legal services clients deserve the
same quality of legal representation as the for-profit client. See Breger, supra note 3, at 1128
(stating that "Ul]egal aid clients should receive the same quality of legal care as private clients").
Comments received by respondents to the survey conducted in conjunction with this
article expressed opposition to different conflict of interest principles being applied to legal
services. See app. infra, Comment 41, at 627 ("I appreciate the conflict problems. However, I
580 [Vol. 37:577
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that decisions concerning who is the recipient of finite resources could be based
entirely on the merit of the client's case and not upon a professional restriction
of the attorney.
Because the demand for legal services for the indigent greatly exceeds the
supply, most providers employ a case acceptance method that limits areas in
which representation may be provided to certain substantive areas;15 most
commonly, public benefits, housing and family law.1 6 A client seeking
representation is first screened for categorical eligibility in terms of income, 17
assets, 18 and citizenship. 19 A client who is categorically eligible for services,
and who is seeking representation in regard to a matter within a substantive
area in which services are provided, has her case screened for merit. The
relative strengths and merits of the numerous cases for which service is
requested are weighed to determine which case will obtain the limited services
available. The cases with the most merit have the greatest likelihood of being
accepted by the office for representation. 20
A conflict of interest can cause a case of great merit to be declined by the
office in favor of one with lesser substantive merit or lesser personal need.
Therefore, a client in need of services will be denied them simply because she
had the bad luck of seeking services from an office that is prevented from
providing services to the client due to the rules of the profession.2 1 The
am very much opposed to creating a different ethical standard for legal services and non legal
services clients."); See also app. infra, Comment 49, at 627 ("Conflict of interest is a constant
problem that would most likely be made worse by the application of different standards to legal
services.").
As discussed herein, infra notes 154-175 and accompanying text, the application of
conflict principles in legal services practice urged in this article is not a compromise to any
standards of professionalism. Rather, because of the different nature of the interests of the legal
services attorney and client, representation can be provided within established standards of the
profession where it would not be allowed for the for-profit practitioner.
15. 45 C.F.R. §§1620.1-1620.5 (1992). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1358 (1976) (approving the use of prioritizing the
substantive areas in which services will be provided by legal services offices). See also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974) (discussing that "[a]s
a practical matter, the resources of a legal services office are always limited, and some allocation
of them upon a basis of priorities must be made if they are to be effectively utilized"). For a
discussion of caseload priorities as a method of allocating limited legal services resources, see
Developments in .he Law-Conflict of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note 6, at 1405-08
(1981).
16. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1992) (providing a
breakdown of types of legal issues encountered by offices funded by The Legal Services
Corporation and listing as the three areas in which services are most frequently sought as
"family" (33%), "housing" (21%) and "income maintenance" (17%)).
17. 45 C.F.R. §1611.5 (1994).
18. 45 C.F.R. §§1611.6-1611.7 (1994).
19. 45 C.F.R. §§1626.1-1626.12 (1994).
20. For discussion of case acceptance methods for purposes of resource allocation, see
generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Robert G. Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal
Services: Individual Attorney Decisions in Work Priorities, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 237 (1983);
Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 282
(1982); Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and
Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978).
21. See Developments in the Law-Conflict of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note
6, at 1407 (stating that "the indigent who is turned away because of a conflict is refused proper
representation because of bad luck.").
Some jurisdictions have found a state constitutional due process right to appointed
counsel in certain civil actions, most notably child custody. See e.g., Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d
1995] 581
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
consequence to the legal services client of this denial of services cannot be
overstated. By far, the most frequent result is that the indigent client is left
without any representation. 22
Certainly there are situations where the conflict presented is such that
representation cannot be undertaken without a compromise to the interests of
the client seeking services, or a compromise to the interests of a past or present
client. Nevertheless, many conflict situations are based upon a presumption of
prejudice to the interests involved, but not upon an actual prejudice.23 If a
conflict of interest problem presents no actual risk of prejudice to the client,
denying that client the only representation available makes little sense,
particularly in light of the serious consequences for the indigent client.
Therefore, an examination of the interests of the legal services attorney and
893 (Alaska 1979); and see Azzarello v. Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, 185 N.E.2d 566 (Oh.
Ct. App. 1962). In such limited situations, the indigent client who is prevented from obtaining
representation from a legal services office due to a conflict of interest is not precluded from any
representation.
22. An anecdotal response to the survey best summarizes the plight of the conflicted legal
services client:
Our program's lack of adequate resources and the lack of any requirement on the
private bar to engage in pro bono representation results in a very substantial
number of low income households being denied any free legal services due to
conflicts of interest we have which prevent our assisting the client.
App. infra, Comment 17, at 620.
See also, app. infra, question 6-25A, at 622-26. Respondents were asked to rate the
relative frequency of certain enumerated consequences that befall the legal services client who
presents the provider with a conflict of interest. 23, which stated, "Client goes without
representation" received, by far, the highest frequency rating." Id. at 620.
Of the 75 responses to #23, only three indicated that the conflicted client "never" is left
without representation. It was somewhat surprising to the author that those responses, R3, R35
and R38, had little in common in terms of either demographic background or approach as to
where the conflicted client would be referred. R3 was received from an office that practices only
in the area of juvenile law and is located in a community of 100,000 - 500,000. R3 rated 16, 17
and 18, in all of which an attorney is found for the conflicted client from, respectively, a list
maintained by the legal services provider, a volunteer attorney or judicial appointment, as
"frequently" occurring. It could be inferred that the relatively large population center provides a
sufficiently large pool of attorneys for conflicted clients. Nevertheless, 23 responses were
received from offices from communities with like or larger populations. R3 was the only one of
the 23 to indicate that the conflicted client "never" is left without representation. Therefore, one
could conclude that the area of practice, juvenile law, where counsel may be statutorily required,
makes R3 an anomaly.
The other "never" responses were received from offices in smaller sized communities.
R35 indicated that the conflicted client was "most often" referred to a "volunteer attorney
program." See Breger, supra note 2, at 1153-55 (arguing against a different application of
conflict principles to legal services practice because such would constitute a compromise to the
fiduciary relationship between attorney and client and discussing options for providing
representation for conflicted indigent clients, including "lawyer referral programs"). The Legal
Services Corporation requires each grantee to expend 12.5% of its funding on private attorney
involvement (PAI). See, 45 C.F.R. §§1614.1-1614.5 (1994). Mr. Breger concludes that "[i]t is
highly unlikely that referral programs will have the capacity to accommodate all conflicted
indigents." Breger, supra note 3, at 1155.
It is most common for PAI funds to be expended, not on representation for conflicted
clients, but on representation in a designated substantive area, such as default divorces. Only
two respondents indicated that PAI funds were used to provide representation for conflicted
clients. See app. infra, question 5A, at 622. One of those was R38, the other "never" response
to #23, "Client goes without representation." See Breger, supra note 3, at 1157-60 (discussing
"the judicare option" as "an effective and comprehensive solution to the conflicts dilemma").
23. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text (discussing the role of presumptions in




client is warranted to determine whether the presumptions of prejudice
reflected in conflict of interest principles as applied to for-profit practice are
applicable to legal services practice. If a significant difference is present in the
interests involved, a conflict of interest in for-profit practice may not pose an
actual threat to the interests of the legal services client. Consequently, the
difference in the nature of the interests involved would make the presumptions
in for-profit conflicts of interest inapplicable to legal services and, therefore,
warrant their abandonment. Case acceptance decisions would then be based
solely on individual case merit, and the cases of greatest merit would receive
the limited available resources and indigent persons would not be denied legal
services from the only available source.
II. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST MOST
FREQUENTLY ENCOUNTERED IN LEGAL SERVICES
PRACTICE
A. A Summary of the Survey
In order to develop an accurate context for an examination of the
application of conflict of interest principles to legal services practide, a survey24
was conducted of all legal services offices25 located in the Seventh and Eighth
Federal Appellate Circuits that receive funding from the Legal Services
Corporation. 26 After soliciting background demographic information in
questions A-E, the survey encompassed three main parts. 27 First, in questions 1-
12, the survey asked respondents to rate the relative frequency that certain
types of conflicts of interest are encountered. 28 In addition to rating relative
24. The survey instrument and summarized results are appended hereto. All responses
received are on file with the author.
The survey does not purport to be statistically rigorous. It is a qualitative account of self-
reported impressions of a diverse group of legal service providers, not a truly randomized,
quantitative study. While the survey provides abundant confirmation of the author's experience
in legal services, and, in my view, the consequent need for the kind of rethinking of conflicts
argued for here, the survey results can not be extrapolated beyond what they purport to be.
25. The offices, numbering 144, were identified by consulting THE 1993/1994
DIRECTORY OF LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
TERRITORIES (1993), a biannual publication of the National Legal Aid & Defender Association.
The mailing list used is on file with the author.
26. The survey was sent to 144 offices identified as described, supra note 25. As of the
date of writing, 83 responses were received. Of the responses, 6 were from offices that do not
directly provide legal services but rather perform an administrative function. Those responses
were not tabulated in the results.
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits were chosen as the target area of the survey for two
main reasons. First, the area represents widely varied demographics, ranging from large
metropolitan areas to small towns. Second, the author previously practiced for ten years with
legal services within the target area, and it was hoped that kindly former colleagues would be
cooperative in taking the time to respond to the survey, thereby increasing the number of
responses.
27. The survey initially sought demographic information from the respondents. The
responses to those questions demonstrated the varied demographics of the survey target area in
terms of community size, ranging from 6 responses from offices in communities that have
populations exceeding 500,000 to 13 responses from offices in communities having populations
below 10,000. Similar distributions also were present in the program size, office size, and
number of years of practice in legal services by the respondents. See app. infra, questions A-E,
at 620.
28. The enumerated conflict of interest circumstances described in the survey represent
the conflict of interest situations the author encountered during his experience in legal services.
5831995]
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frequency, the survey also asked for a rating of the frequency that the specific
conflict of interest involves actual prejudice to the client(s) involved. The
intention was to determine if indigent persons are precluded from obtaining
legal services in circumstances that do not protect the client from actual
prejudice. This proved to be the case.29
Second, in questions 13-15, the survey sought information as to the
frequency that the conflicts of interest encountered arose by means of the
imputation rule.30 If so, the survey then asked about the frequency that the
imputed conflict involved attorneys in a single office and attorneys in different
offices of a multi-office legal services program. The results indicated that
conflicts are imputed between attorneys in one office more frequently than
when they involve only one attorney in an office or are imputed between
attorneys in different offices in a program.3'
Third, in questions 16-25, the survey sought information as to the
relative frequency that certain enumerated consequences befall the legal
services client who presents the office with a conflict of interest. By far the
Joseph Dailing, Executive Director, and Bernie Shapiro, Director of Litigation, Prairie State
Legal Services, provided much helpful assistance in reviewing drafts of the survey and making
many useful suggestions.
The survey asked respondents to rate relative frequency by assigning each situation a
number 1-5, with 1 indicating that the situation never occurs, and 5 indicating that the situation
occurs most frequently. The responses were tabulated by totaling the responses and dividing the
total by the number of responses received in order to determine a "frequency rating," the average
response received. The number of respondents selecting each numerical relative frequency value
and frequency ratings are printed in italics and placed in brackets on the Survey and
Supplemental Responses directly following each inquiry. All responses are on file with the
author.
In the event that the survey did not enumerate all conflict situations and client
consequences that the respondent might have encountered, the survey offered the respondent the
opportunity to describe additional situations in questions 10-12 and 24-25. The supplemental
responses received were reviewed and categorized into categories of comparable situations
enumerated in the document entitled Supplemental Responses, 10-12C, and 24-25A. The
alphabetical designation only represents that the author underestimated the number of
supplemental responses that would be received.
Many supplemental responses represented a conflict situation that the author considered
to be the functional equivalent of that described in the Survey, though the response described the
conflict situation in terms of a factual scenario that differed from the example given in the
Survey. Because the respondent considered the factual situation in the supplemental response to
vary from the situation described in the survey, those responses were tabulated separately.
Those responses are designated with the numerical designation of the original question and the
alphabetical designation "D," intended to designate duplicate.
Also, supplemental responses described situations that were substantially similar to the
enumerated questions but that presented a factual situation that the author considered to vary
sufficiently to warrant separate tabulation. Those responses are described at Supplemental
Response IA, 1P and 3A.
Finally, the survey offered each respondent the opportunity to make narrative comments.
Those comments that relate to the issues discussed herein are appended hereto. All responses are
on file with the author.
29. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing that the survey
demonstrated that actual client prejudice is not present in all instances that a conflict of interest
occurs).
30. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1992) (providing that
"[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when
any one of then practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or
2.2.").
31. See app. infra, questions 13-15, at 625.
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most frequent result is that the legal services client who presents the office with
a conflict of interest is unable to secure representation from any source.32
B. The Conflicts Encountered by the Legal Services Attorney and
the Role of Presumptions Therein
Two conflict situations were identified by the survey as those most
frequently encountered by the legal services office. In the first, "simultaneous
adverse representation," 33 each opposing party seeks representation from the
same legal services provider, most likely in the context of a husband and wife,
each seeking representation in a family law matter.3 4 This situation involves the
prohibition against representation that is directly adverse to another client
contained in Model Rule 1.7(a)35 and the rule of vicarious, or imputed
32. See app. infra, questions 16-25A, at 625-26 (identifying in #23, "Client goes
without representation" as the most frequent consequence for the legal services client who
presents the office with a conflict of interest); See also, supra note 22 (discussing the
consequence to the legal services client who presents the office with a conflict situation).
33. See app. infra, questions #1, 1A, 1D and 1P, at 621 (identifying the "dual
representation" situation as the most frequently occurring conflict situation for legal services
attorneys); see also app. infra, Comment 50 at 627 ('"e really don't reject many cases based on
conflicts - most common is the race to the phone between fighting spouses.").
34. The dual representation situation is largely, if not entirely limited to family law cases.
By definition, the majority of cases handled by the legal services attorney do not have a
possibility of having a legal services eligible client as the opposing party. The retrenchment that
took place in Legal Services in the early 1980's left case acceptance priorities limited to three
main substantive areas: public benefit related matters, housing matters and family law..Public
benefit cases, of course, have a governmental agency as the opposing party, and housing cases
have either a governmental agency or a financially ineligible private party as the opposing party.
As indicated in the supplemental responses received, the dual representation conflict has
several variations. In #lA, three respondents indicated that the opposing parties approach the
office at the same time (as opposed to sequentially as posed in the original survey question)
seeking representation. See app. infra, question IA, at 621. In such case, the consent
mechanism of Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) and (2) would appear to allow representation to proceed.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.7(a)(1) & (2) (1992) ("A lawyer
shall not represent a client if the representation of the client will be directly adverse to another
client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and (2) each client consents after consultation).
See Breger, supra note 3, at 1120 n.26 (citing cases upholding dual representation when
consent is obtained). But see id. at 1135-36 (questioning the use of consent to dual
representation for the indigent client who does not have a viable alternative to the conflicted
representation).
In #1P, four respondents indicated that the dual representation situation involves one or
both of them seeking representation from a Private Attorney Involvement Program operated by
the legal services office. Some states have adopted an approach that does not consider this
situation to countenance an impermissible conflict of interest. See, e.g., Professional Ethics
Comm. of the Florida State Bar Association, Op. 92-1 (11-1-92) (allowing a legal aid agency to
assign opposing parties to separate pro bono attorneys, or represent one party while assigning
the opposing party to a pro bono attorney); Standing Comm. of the Virginia State Bar, Op. 1460
(4-13-92) (allowing attorney participating in legal services pro bono program to represent a client
in a family law matter where the opposing party is represented by the legal services program).
35. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1233
(1972) (legal services office may not represent individuals in action against Native American
Tribe while at same time representing the Tribe); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1309 (1975) (stating that attorneys from two legal services
programs, one of which serves as the conduit for funds to the other but that are otherwise
unconnected are not prevented from representing adverse parties, but that result would be
different in attorneys were part of same organization).
But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1235
(1972) (discussing simultaneous representation by military attorneys providing free legal
services to military personnel and concluding that there was not a blanket disqualification from
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disqualification contained in Model Rule 1.10(a), thereby disqualifying all
attorneys in the firm if one attorney has a conflict and prohibiting attorneys in
the same legal services office or program from representing adverse parties. 36
In the second, the "former client as adverse" party situation, the client seeks
representation in a matter in which the adverse party had been previously
represented by the office, and the previous matter is "substantially related" to
the present matter in which the client now seeks representation, 37 a situation
prohibited by Model Rule 1.9(a). 38 As with the simultaneous adverse
representation situation, the former client as adverse party also involves the
rule of imputed disqualification contained in Model Rule 1.10(a) disqualifying
all attorneys in an office or program if one previously represented the former
client.39
These two situations certainly do not represent all of the conflict
situations encountered in legal services. 40 Nevertheless, both represent the use
so doing because, in part, of the option of the military client to secure other, non-military
counsel). For discussion of the implications of Informal Opinion 1235 to legal services for
indigents, see Goff, supra note 4, at 306-07 (1973) (discussing that legal services clients should
benefit from an analogous interpretation of conflict of interest principles).
See generally Aronson, supra note 4, at 821-32 (1977); Craig D. Grear, Current
Developments-Conflicts of Interest: Simultaneous Representation, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
101, 101-13 (1988); Developments-Conflicts ofInterest, supra note 5, at 1292-1315 (1981).
36. See, Model Rule 1.10 (a) (disqualifying all attorneys in a firm if one attorney has a
conflict); and see generally, Aronson, supra note 4, at 851-58 (1977); Christopher J. Bellini,
Current Developments-Conflicts of Interest: Vicarious Disqualification: Second-Hand Taint, 2
GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 101, 129-37 (1988); Nancy Ribaudo, Current Developments-Conflicts
of Interest: Vicarious Disqualification: Government and Non-Profit Agencies, 2 GEO J. LEGAL
ETHICS 101, 139-42 (1988); Developments-Conflicts of Interest, supra note 5, at 1352-73(1981).
37. See app. infra, #2 and #2D, at 621-22 (identifying the past client as adverse party
situation as the second most frequently occurring conflict situation for legal services attorneys).
For example, a woman seeks representation in a family law matter from a legal services
office that previously represented her husband in a claim for disability benefits. The situations
could be considered substantially related if the information gained from the husband concerning
his financial situation was relevant to an issue in the family law matter such as child support or
division of property or debts.
38. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1233(1972) (discussing the subsequent representation by a legal services office of a client against a
former client).
See generally, Aronson, supra note 4, at 833-35 (1977); Rick R. Rothman, Current
Developments-Conflicts of Interest: Subsequent Adverse Representation, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 101, 119-28 (1988); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal
Profession,, supra note 6, at 1315-34 (198 1).
39. See Model Rule 1.10(a) (providing that "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm,
none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2"); see also Goldberg, supra note 2(criticizing the use in combination of the rule against successive representation and the rule of
imputed conflicts).
40. Legal services attorneys represent clients in narrowly defined areas of the law.
Additionally, the client population comprises a narrowly defined segment of the population who
often live in close geographic proximity in housing projects or neighborhoods comprised of
persons who are similarly situated economically. Therefore, the possibility for a conflict of
interest due to a material limitation of representation of one client due to the attorney's
representation of a second client is far greater than that which the private practitioner commonly
faces. Three additional situations deserve mention.
The first is the "multiple client/separate defense" situation. See app. infra, questions 6 and
6D at 622-13 (identifying this as the third most frequently occurring conflict situation
encountered in legal services). As an example, several tenants of a public housing project seek
representation in regard to eviction actions that stem from one common event involving children
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of each tenant seeking representation. Each may seek to defend against the eviction on the basis
that their child was not a participant, or that another's child was the instigator. Unless one client
sought representation prior to any of the others coming to the legal services office and the
potential for conflict was spotted prior to an interview being conducted with any of the other
tenants, representation would have to be declined for all.
The attorney's obligations of confidentiality, loyalty and zealous representation would be
compromised toward all of the parties. Information learned from any one client in a confidential
setting has the potential to be helpful or detrimental to any other client as the attorney prepares to
defend each action on the basis of challenging who was the actual responsible and offendingparty. The second is the "client as adverse witness" situation. See app. infra, questions 3 and
3A at 621 (identifying this as the fifth most frequently occurring conflict situation for the legal
services attorney). As an example, the attorney represents Client One in a public benefit matter.
Client Two, who is the neighbor of Client One, seeks representation in regard to an eviction
from the public housing project in which both Client One and Client Two reside. Though the
two actions are unrelated, during the course of representation of Client Two, the attorney learns
that Client One will be called as an adverse witness to Client Two in the eviction proceeding.
Seemingly, the attorney would be placed in the situation of having to compromise
obligations owed to both clients. If the attorney is to cross examine Client One, the attorney
would be faced with deciding whether to make use of information she knows about Client One
that was learned during the course of her representation of Client One, thereby breaching
obligations of confidentiality and loyalty. If the attorney chose not to utilize such information,
the attorney would then breach obligations of loyalty and zealous representation owed to Client
Two.
In the third, the "organizational client" situation. See app. infra, questions 7 and 7D at
622 (identifying this as the sixth most frequently occurring conflict encountered in legal
services). As an example, the legal services attorney represents a tenant's union in a public
housing project that is active in efforts to improve the quality of life in the project by combating
drug sale and use. Client, a tenant in the project, seeks representation from the office in an
eviction action based on alleged drug use. The attorney's representation of the Client may be
materially limited by the attorney's obligation of loyalty to the organizational client, particularly if
the attorney, in the defense of the tenant, must take a position that is at least inconsistent with, or
possibly even an attack on the position of the organizational client. If the attorney chooses to
forgo such defense, she would be breaching her duty of loyalty and zealous representation to the
tenant Client.
As will be discussed in the context of the "dual representation" and "subsequent
representation" situations, these three situations also present the possibility that a conflict may
exist that precludes representation, but that is not necessarily presented by the situation. Each
involves reliance upon presumptions to find that conflict of interest prevents representation even
though the conflict may not actually compromise the obligations owed by an attorney to her
client. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
Though beyond the scope of this article, one additional situation merits mention, the
"positional conflict" situation, in which the attorney's obligations of loyalty and zealous
representation to the client are challenged by the attorney's desire to further the interests of
potential future clients. See app. infra, question 9, at 612 (identifying the "positional conflict"
situation as the fourth most frequently occurring conflict for the legal services attorney). As an
example, Client faces eviction from a subsidized housing project for an alleged breach of the
lease. Though Client's landlord arguably refused to accept rent from the Client in order to not
waive the right to declare a forfeiture of the lease for the alleged breach, the landlord did accept
the rent subsidy for the rental unit. If the law in the jurisdiction is unsettled as to whether the
acceptance of the rent subsidy constitutes a waiver, the legal services attorney may wish to not
raise the defense, either at trial or on appeal, if the facts are not entirely favorable. Even though
the defense could be raised within the constraints of any state equivalent of Rule 11, the attorney
chooses not to do so and prefers to wait for a better case in which to raise it. It is a matter of not
wanting to have bad facts make bad law that will later adversely affect future clients.
Whereas in the other conflict situations discussed above, the legal services attorney may
decline representation because of the conflict, in the positional conflict situation representation is
not declined because of a conflict of interest recognized by any standard of professional ethics.
Instead, representation is declined out of a generalized concern for the client population that the
legal services attorney seeks to serve. Because the declination of representation is not dictated by
conflict of interest principles, it is beyond the scope of this article which examines whether those
principles should have a different application in the context of legal services due to the nature of
19951
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
of a presumption of threat of compromise to the attorney-client relationship to
find that representation is impermissible. 4 1 Model Rule 1.10(a), a significant
principle in both the simultaneous adverse representation and former client as
adverse party situations, presumes that confidential client information will be
exchanged between attorneys who practice in the same office, and that it could
and will be used to compromise client interests.42 Model Rule 1.9(a), the crux
of the former client as adverse party situation, presumes that confidential
information was obtained from a former client, which is prejudicial and will be
used to the detriment of the former client in representation of the present client
in a substantially related matter.43
It is these presumptions that serve to unnecessarily cause the denial of
representation for the legal services client. The survey conducted in conjunction
with this article revealed that, in both situations, the frequency that actual
prejudice is involved in each conflict is less than the frequency of occurrence of
the conflict itself. 44 Therefore, the presumptions that give rise to finding an
impermissible conflict for the for-profit attorney operate to deny
representation of the indigent client in situations where proceeding with
representation would not pose actual prejudice to client interests. 45 The heart of
attorney and client interests involved. In fact one might argue that such is not a conflict of
interest at all, but rather is a decision as to the allocation of limited resources.
41. See Paul R. Taskier and Alan H. Casper, Vicarious Disqualification of Co-Counsel
Because of "Taint", 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 157-58 (1987) (discussing the role of
presumptions in "two of the most common conflict situations: simultaneous representation of
adverse interests and representation of interests adverse to a former client."); and id. at 157-59(citing cases employing presumptions to find an impermissible conflict of interest).
42. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt.
at 175 (2d ed. 1992) (('The rule is based upon the presumption that client confidences are shared
among law firm members and that these confidences must be protected.") Id. (citations
omitted)).
43. The circuits vary as to the effect of the presumption in the former client situation. In
the Seventh Circuit, the presumption is rebuttable as to whether the attorney received confidential
information during the prior representation. See, In re Nine West Div., 78 B.R. 187, 190(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (discussing a "rebuttable presumption that the attorney received
confidential information during his prior representation."). In the Second Circuit, the
presumption that confidential information was disclosed is irrebuttable. See, Kempner v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 662 F.Supp. 1271, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Allegaert v. Perot, 565
F.2d 335, 338 (2d Cir. 1977)) and stating that "once a substantial relationship has been
established, the court need not inquire whether the attorney in fact received confidential
information, because the receipt of such information will be presumed.").
44. See app. infra, question 1, at 621 (finding a frequency rating for the dual
representation conflict of 3.519 and a frequency rating for the presence of actual prejudice of
3.351); and, question 2, at 614 (finding a frequency rating for the subsequent representation
conflict of 3.325 and a frequency rating for the presence of actual prejudice of 2.805).
The subsequent representation situation demonstrated the greatest disparity between
frequency of occurrence and prejudice. It is the anecdotal observations of the author that such a
result is not at all surprising. Many persons seeking representation from a legal services office
are not able to obtain them due to considerations of financial ineligibility or resource allocation
decisions concerning the nature of their legal problem. The denial of legal services occurs after
the client has completed an application or intake questionnaire that seeks information about
income, assets, nature of legal problem, etc. Additionally, the client may have participated in an
initial screening interview. Such person would be considered a former client for purposes of a
Model Rule 1.9 determination of conflict of interest, though the limited nature or extent of the
information obtained by the attorney at this early stage is unlikely to make it prejudicial to the
client.
45. Comments made by respondents to the survey support the conclusion that the
reliance upon presumptions in analyzing conflicts of interest results in determinations of
impermissible conflicts of interest in situations where there is not actual prejudice to the client.
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the question then is whether the presumption of prejudice involved in conflict
of interest rules serves to unnecessarily foreclose the legal services client from
the only available source of representation. 46
HI. THE INTERESTS OF THE ATTORNEY SUBJECT TO
CONFLICT - A DIFFERENT PROFESSIONAL
STANDARD OR A DIFFERENT PROFESSION?
A. Defining the Issue: A Different Profession
Arguably, the goal of accepting cases based entirely on considerations of
merit and need does not alone justify rethinking the application of basic
principles of conflicts of interest. 47 In that those principles speak to the basic
concepts of zealous representation and protection of client confidences that are
at the essence of the attorney-client relationship, their application should not be
altered if doing so degrades the basic nature of the attorney-client
relationship. 48 Much of the debate concerning conflicts of interest and legal
services has centered on the question of whether, in light of legal services as the
attorney of last resort, a different, and perhaps "lesser" standard of professional
ethics is warranted. 49 That posturing of the question has led critics of a
different conflict of interest standard for legal services to a fairly obvious
See app. infra, comment 38, at 627 ("Given the tiny community here, I often encounter conflicts
that leave me frustrated because although a legal 'conflict' exists, no real conflict does." Id.
(emphasis as in original)).
46. Even the critics of a different application of conflict principles in legal services have
recognized the importance of denying representation to legal services clients due to a conflict of
interest only where absolutely necessary to preserve the basic nature of the attorney/client
relationship. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 3, at 1131 which states:
Care must be taken, however, to ensure that disqualifications are not compelled
when they would not further the goal of preserving this [attorney/client]
relationship. The extraordinary result of disqualification-the inability of the
conflicted client to obtain legal counsel--dictates that disqualifications be avoided
unless absolutely essential to this goal. If the fiduciary relationship would not be
compromised, by permitting dual or subsequent representation, disqualification
arguably should not be mandated.
Id.
47. Id. at 1129-30 ("Although legal aid providers must follow principles of equity in
allocating their services, this obligation does not dictate that indigents be represented when
attorney resources are not available to provide quality representation ... [T]he fiduciary
relationship between attorney and client must not be sacrificed on the altar of caseload
pressure.").
But see, Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra
note 6, at 1400 (discussing that, "[flor that reason [the availability of the poor to obtain legal
aid], if no other, it is imperative to determine whether existing [conflict] rules affect
representation and, if so, whether and how they should be changed.").
48. See Breger, supra note 3, at 1128-29 ("Legal aid clients should receive the same
quality of legal care as private clients, and should be ensured the loyalty and confidentiality
which is characteristic of the attorney-client relationship.").
It is this argument that has lead courts to reject a different application-of conflict of
interests principles in legal services practice. See, e.g., Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89, 91, 91
n.5 (D.C. 1971); Township Bd. v. Lewis, 234 N.W. 2d 815, 819 (Minn. 1975).
49. See Breger, supra note 3, at 1128 ('These sentiments suggest that a firm adherence
to the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client may be ill-advised when juxtaposed
against the possibility that otherwise eligible clients will be left unrepresented."); Developments
in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note 6, at 1408-13 (arguing for
a relaxation of conflicts rules for legal services practice).
1995] 589
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
answer - no.50 Creating a different standard of professional ethics for legal
services could lead to several undesirable results.
First, legal services clients deserve the same degree of loyalty,
confidentiality, client autonomy and zealous representation as do any other
clients of an attorney. 51 To conclude otherwise would create a client who
receives representation that is second-rate due to that person's indigency. Not
only would that run contrary to the purposes for which the legal services
program was created, it simply is insulting to the population served by legal
services to adopt a "you get what you pay for" mentality.52
Second, creating a different standard of professional ethics for legal
services could also serve to begin an ethical fragmentation of the profession.
Many specialties, building upon the legal services model, could claim that the
particular nature of their practice warrants a variation in ethical
responsibilities. 53 Taken too far, the result becomes a multiplicity of ethical
codes - something surely contrary to the intention of the organized profession
that wrote the rules in the first place.5 4 One can only imagine the less
scrupulous attorney, wishing to embark on a course of conduct generally
prohibited by ethical standards, bringing a claim or defense that otherwise
would not have been brought in order to raise the specter of practicing within a
sub-specialty of the bar whose professional code allows that which is otherwise
not permissible for the general practitioner. Therefore, in order for conflict
50. See Breger, supra note 3, at 1128-31 (rejecting a different conflicts of interest
standard for legal services as "superficially appealing" but "misguided"); Breger, supra note 3, at
1128-29 ("Legal aid clients should receive the same quality of legal care as private clients, and
should be ensured the loyalty and confidentiality which is characteristic of the attorney-client
relationship.").
But see Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra
note 6, at 1408-13 (arguing for relaxing conflicts rles for legal services practice).
51. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981)
(stating that "[e]ach of these mandatory obligations is applicable to all lawyers, including legal
services lawyers." Id. (citing ABA Informal Ops. 1359 (1976) and 1428 (1979)); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1233 (1972) (stating that "[t]he
professional standards regarding representation of differing interests apply to legal aid offices the
same as to other lawyers." Id. (citing Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. 1971)).
See also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§2996(l)-(6) (1994) (establishing the Legal Services Corporation, in
part, to provide "equal access" to the judicial system and "high quality assistance" to persons
unable to afford legal representation).
53. See, e.g., Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct
for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993) (arguing in the context of
corporate and securities law that specialized areas of practice need separate standards of ethical
conduct).
54. It was the intention of the drafters of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT that they be equally applicable to all members of the profession, no matter what the
nature of their practice might be. See, Robert W. Meserve, Chair's Introduction, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992) (discussing that the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT "are intended to serve as a national framework for implementation of
standards of professional conduct.. .that speaks to such a diverse constituency as the legal
profession...." Id. at 5).
See also, 42 U.S.C. § 2996(6) (1994) ("... attorneys providing legal assistance must
have full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Ethics, and the high standards of the legal
profession"); see also, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 324
(1970) (discussing, in part, that in representation of indigent clients, "[it goes without saying,"
legal services attorneys are bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility or Canons of
Ethics to the same degree as would be an attorney not associated with legal services).
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principles to be given a different application, there must be something in the
nature of legal services practice that makes it fundamentally different from the
rest of the profession.
Rather than focusing the debate on whether legal services attorneys
should be held to a different set of professional standards, the debate instead
should focus on whether existing professional ethical standards can be
maintained while giving conflict of interest principles a different application in
the legal services context. An examination of the interests involved in conflict
of interest doctrine serves as the starting point for discussion of whether the
nature of legal services practice warrants an application of conflict of interest
principles that is different than that applied in for-profit practice.
By examining the interests of the legal services client and attorney that
may be in conflict, it is seen that the threat of compromise to the legal services
attorney-client relationship is not co-extensive with that in the for-profit
attorney-client relationship. First, the legal services attorney does not have a
pecuniary interest in the representation of a specific client. Second, the legal
services attorney-client relationship is unique because of the serious result of a
preclusion of representation due to a conflict of interest - the legal services
client is left without any representation. It is only the legal services client who
possesses this interest in procuring representation from one available source.
For the indigent client, the legal services office is truly the "last lawyer in
town." These fundamental differences in the interests of attorney and client set
legal services apart from any other attorney-client relationship.
In light of these unique interests of the legal services attorney and client,
conflict of interests principles are able to have a different application in the
legal services context than in the context of for-profit practice without
compromising established professional standards in terms of the duties and
obligations owed to a client.55 This conclusion is reached by giving the interests
of the legal services client and attorney the same effect that such interests are
given when they occur in analogous situations in other aspects of regulation of
the profession, such as the prohibitions against solicitation of clients and
advancing financial support to clients. It is then seen that the presumptions of
prejudice, based upon the model of for-profit practice, are both inappropriate
and unnecessary in legal services practice. An argument by any other specialty
area of the profession for a different application of conflict principles would
fail, for it is only the unique nature of legal services as the "last lawyer in
town" that warrants this different application.
B. Identifying the Interests Subject to Conflict in the Ethical
Standard
The question of what constitutes a conflict of interest has been explained
largely by the use of situational examples,56 or a listing of duties owed the
55. See Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 896 (Alaska. 1979) (discussing ways that
attorneys from one legal services office could represent adverse parties in a child custody
consistent with established standards of professional ethics).
56. See Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 823, 826-29 (1992) (discussing the use of narrow factual examples to explain
conflicts of interest by the Model Code, the Model Rules, courts, ethics committees, treatises
and articles); and, id. at 844 (discussing that "[t]reatments of the subject in treatises and
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client by the'attomey.57 An impermissible conflict exists when an attorney's
duties and obligations to her client are compromised. Nevertheless, guidance is
lacking as to which attorney interests compromise which client interests, and
when those interests are sufficiently in conflict so as to warrant representation
not going'forward.58 Therefore, there is little definitional guidance for conflict
situations that fall outside the situational examples that have been used to
explain when an impermissible conflict of interest exists. 59
This lack of definitional guidance has served to lead astray the application
of conflict of interest principles in the context of legal services representation.60
Conflicts of interest in legal services simply have been plugged into situational
examples from the context of for-profit representation. The situations may be
factually similar, and the duties of the attorney owed the client are the same.
Nevertheless, the interests of attorney and client are different when
representation is undertaken by a legal services attorney with no economic
interest in the outcome of the case on behalf of a client who has limited
opportunity, if any, due to indigency, to obtain representation from another
source in the event that the legal services attorney has an impermissible conflict
of interest. 61 Therefore, an examination of the application of conflict principles
to legal services practice must begin with an examination of the interests of the
client sought to be protected and of the interests of the attorney that can be in
conflict with those of the client.62 If the discussion does not take place in terms
of the actual interests potentially in conflict, but rather is limited to
hypothetically comparative situations or disembodied attorney duties, one does
not appreciate the fundamental difference in the nature of legal services
representation. The result then reached - prohibiting the conflict because of a
casebooks frequently begin not with a definition of conflict of interest, but by providing
examples of situations in which interests 'conflict'.").
Another approach taken by treatises addressing what is a conflict of interest is to combine
situational examples with broad statements defining the goals sought to be served by conflict
doctrine. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
supra note 6, at 1244 (1981) (prefacing over 200 pages of situational examples with several
statements of goals; such as, "...the purpose of legal ethics is to ensure that the lawyer advance
certain objectives of the client," id. at 1252; and, "Conflict-of-interest rules attempt to ensure the
lawyer's dedication to the client and the client alone" Id. at 1254).
57. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
supra note 6, at 1252-60 (seeking to define conflicts of interest by first exploring the purpose of
professional ethics in terms of the lawyer's duties owed the client and attempting to distinguish
"principal duties" from "collateral duties").
58. See, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n.3 (1980) ("'Conflict of interests' is a
term that is often used and seldom defined.").
59. The Model Rules also are devoid of a definition of what is a conflict of interest.
Model Rule 1.7(a) states that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation will be
directly adverse to another client...." What is lacking is a definition of how to determine what
interests serve to make the representation "adverse," and what raises the degree of adversity
involved to the level of being "directly adverse." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.7(a).
60. See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text for discussion of Borden v. Borden,
277 A.2d 89 (D.C. 1971).
61. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict
situations most frequently encountered by the legal services attorney and how the interests
involved differ from those of the for-profit attorney in the same situation.
62. See McMunigal, supra note 56, at 826-33 (discussing that conceptual confusion
exists in present conflict of interest doctrine because, instead of defining the "general standards"
and "underlying ordering principles," conflicts of interest largely have been explained by the
resort to categorization of specific factual contexts).
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falsely perceived "compromise" in the representation to the legal services client
- is predictable, but wrong.63 When however, the different interets at stake in
legal services representation are appreciated, it is then seen that there is no
compromise to the duties owed to the legal services client to obtain
representation in a conflict situation that would preclude representation by the
for-profit attorney.
A definition from an often cited article on conflicts of interest serves as a
useful starting point:64
A conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney, or any person
represented by the attorney, has interests adverse in any way to the
advice or course of action which should be available to the present
client. A conflict exists whenever this tension exists-even if the
attorney eventually takes the course of action most beneficial to the
present client.65
For the definition to be fully understood, an explication of the respective
"interests" of the attorney and the client is also necessary. 66
The "interests" of the client are commonly considered to be a
preservation of confidentiality of information imparted to the attorney during
the course of representation 67 and the provision of zealous representation by an
attorney whose loyalty to the client is undivided.68 The legal services client,
however, has the additional interest of being able to secure representation from
63. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 3, at 1127-31 (1982) (arguing that any application of
conflict principles to legal services that would result in representation in situations that would be
impermissible for the for-profit practitioner would be a "downgrading" of the quality of
representation provided); and Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89, 92-93 (D.C. 1971) (discussing
that to allow two attorneys from the same legal services program to represent adverse parties in a
divorce action would be an "exception from the professional norm for attorneys" that would be
contrary to the expectation of an "uncompromising adherence to the profession's established
standards.").
64. Professor Aronson's article on conflicts of interest has been referred to as "[t]he best
general analysis of conflicts of interest problems." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAwYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT §1.7: 101, at 217 n.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1991).
For a useful review of attempts to define conflict of interest, see McMunigal, supra note
56, at 843-53.
65. Aronson, supra note 4, at 809.
66. See McMunigal, supra note 56, at 829-33 (describing the common element in conflict
of interest doctrine as "some particular incentive which threatens the effective and ethical
functioning of lawyers").
67. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.3 at 317 (1986)
(stating that the "confidentiality principle" is the "second principle" underlying conflict of interest
rules protecting against adverse use or disclosure of a client's confidential information); See
also, Aronson, supra note 4, at 811-12 (discussing the preservation of client confidences as one
of the "general principles" of conflict of interest rules); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of
Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note 6, at 1255 (discussing confidentiality as a "collateral
duty" owed a client by an attorney); ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.7, cmt. (ABA 2d ed. 1992) (discussing the loyalty element of the lawyer/client
relationship, and that loyalty prohibits undertaking representation that is adverse to the client).
68. See WOLFRAM, supra note 67, § 7.1.3 at 316-17 (discussing the "loyalty principle"
in conflict of interest doctrine as a "basic tenet of the Anglo-American conception of the attorney-
client relationship"); See also, Aronson, supra note 4, at 811 (discussing the prevention of the
dilution of the attorney's loyalty to her client as one of the "general principles" of conflict of
interest rules); Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra
note 6, at 1254 (stating that as the "principal duty" owed a client by an attorney is to "take that
action that is best calculated to advance the client's interests....").
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the only source available.69 This interest is unique and is not shared by clients
in any other context.
The interests of the attorney that can come into conflict with those of the
client, thus dividing the attorney's loyalty, are several. The attorney has
personal financial interests and interests owed to third persons, such as other
clients or the attorney's law partners.70 Here again, legal services practice
varies from for-profit practice. The legal services attorney lacks both the
personal economic interests and the economic interests owed to law partners
that are present with the for-profit practitioner.71 The lack of economic
interests by the attorney are not unique to legal services. Public defenders
similarly have no pecuniary interests in their attorney-client relationships or
practice relationships. Nevertheless, while courts have applied conflict
principles differently to public defenders based upon the lack of attorney
economic interests, they have not done so in legal services practice.72
Though absent from the previous definition, another "interest" echoes
throughout considerations of whether a conflict of interest is present - the
interest of the legal profession in putting forth a good public face by seeking to
have attorneys avoid the "appearance of impropriety." 73 Though it could be
argued that this interest of the profession is among the interests of the
attorney,74 it is more appropriately considered an interest independent of either
attorney or client because the interest of the profession in appearances can be in
conflict with either attorney or client when it requires that representation must
69. See infra notes 139-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interest of the
legal services client in securing representation, and the impact of this interest on conflict of
interest analysis.
70. Aronson, supra note 4, at 811 (discussing the financial interests of the attorney).
71. See infra notes 93-138 and accompanying text for discussion of the impact upon
conflict of interest analysis of the lack of pecuniary interests of the legal services attorney.
72. See infra notes 144-150 and accompanying text for discussion of courts that have
taken the lack of economic interests of public defenders into account in conflict of interest
analysis resulting in an application of conflict rules that is different than that applied to the for-
profit practitioner.
73. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1233
(1972) (discussing that subsequent representation by legal services office against former client
might be prohibited by appearances of impropriety even though the actions are unrelated and not
a violation of any Disciplinary Rule).
See also Aronson, supra note 4, at 810-11 (discussing the role of the avoiding the
appearance of impropriety standard in conflict of interest rules and stating, "[b]ecause the
appearance of impropriety can be just as damaging as actual impropriety to public respect for the
law and clients' belief in their attorney's loyalty, attorneys must ensure that their conduct does
not reasonably appear to have been influenced by conflicting interests."); and WOLFRAM, supra
note 67, § 7.1.4 at 319-23 (discussing "methodological weaknesses" in judicial reliance upon
the appearance of impropriety standard and criticizing use of the standard as an independent
basis for finding that a conflict of interest exists).
"Appearance of impropriety," a concept of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, was specifically abandoned by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9, cmt. at 160-61 (stating that "...the
term 'appearance of impropriety' is question begging" and that "...a functional analysis is more
appropriate....").
74. Aronson, supra note 4, at 811 (discussing that the legal profession is among the third
"person" interests that can serve to dilute attorney loyalty).
One might also argue that the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety is an interest of
the client in that such avoidance serves to preserve client confidence in the attorney's undivided




be declined.75 In such situations, the client is not able to receive representation
by the attorney of choice, and the attorney is not able to receive the financial
benefit of representation of the client. Again, when this interest of the
profession is balanced against the interest of the legal services client in
representation from the only source available, one must seriously question
whether preserving the public face of the profession justifies a total denial of
representation for the indigent client.
C. The Interests of the Attorney: No Money - No Problem
As for the interests of the attorney with which conflict principles are
concerned, there are two fundamental differences in legal services practice that
are at the heart of that which makes the world go around - money, or more
appropriately, the lack thereof. First, the legal services attorney derives no
economic benefit directly from her client, but rather is compensated on a salary
basis by her program.76 The legal services attorney has no personal economic
interest in the outcome of a particular case. Therefore, when confronted with a
situation where the interests of two clients become adverse, there would not be
an economic incentive to favor one client over another.77 Second, the nature of
the legal services office is not a partnership where the attorneys in an office
have a shared economic interest in the outcome of cases.78 Therefore, the
underlying economic rationale is absent for imputing disqualification to all
attorneys in an office if one attorney has a conflict.79
75. There is also disagreement as to with whom the profession is concerned observing its
appearance, the profession, clients, the public, etc. See, WOLFRAM, supra, note 67, § 7.1.4 at
320.
76. But see Breger, supra note 3, at 1130-31 n.69 (discussing that attorney
compensation by salary basis is not unique to legal services).
77. But see id. at 1130-31 (discussing that though economic motivations to favor one
client over another may be absent in legal services practice, other motivations are present to do
so that are rooted in "human nature" are present).
78. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6 (defining a partnership as an association of
two or more persons conducting a business for profit).
In cases undertaken by legal services attorneys where there is a possibility of being
awarded attorneys' fees, the attorneys in an office or program do have a shared economic
interest in the outcome of the case. Though the award does not go to the individual attorney
involved in the case, or to supplement existing salaries, see 45 C.F.R. §§1609.1-1609.8
(1992), an award of attorneys' fees is not an insignificant line item in an office or program
budget. See, e.g., PRAIRIE STATE LEGAL SERVICES, INC.: REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY 7
(1994) (reporting that 5.7% of its 1993 revenues came from court awarded attorneys' fees).
Because awards of attorneys' fees are seldom sought from an adverse party who is
financially or categorically eligible to be a legal services client, the shared economic interest in
attorneys' fees situation will seldom present an adverse-parties conflict, or the past-client as
former-adverse-party conflict, the two situations most frequently encountered in legal services.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §1988(b) (supp. 1993) (providing, in part, for an award of attorneys' fees
in cases brought against persons acting under color of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(supp. 1993)). Nevertheless, there may be situations where a conflict exists because a past or
present client is called as an adverse witness to a present legal services client in an action that
seeks attorneys' fees. In such case, the shared economic interest may cause the legal services
attorney to be considered in the same fashion as the for-profit attorney if that interest would
cause the disclosure of confidential information of the adverse witness obtained during the
course of the prior representation.
79. See WOLFRAM, supra note 67, at § 7.6.2, pg. 391 (discussing the shared economic
interests of attorneys in a partnership that have led to the adoption of the imputation rle).
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The absence of these two economic interests, on its face, indicates that
legal services practice is a different creature than private practice.80 The
question then to be considered is whether these differences form a sufficient
basis for rethinking when a conflict of interest is present that prevents
representation of an indigent person who has no other opportunity to obtain
representation.
In several areas of professional regulation the absence of economic
incentives does allow the legal services attorney to be treated differently than
the rest of the profession.8 1 Two exceptions to long established prohibitions
against certain unprofessional conduct, the prohibition against solicitation of
clients and the prohibition against providing financial assistance to a client,
provide the strongest examples of how the lack of economic interests on the
part on an attorney alters the application of a principle of professional conduct.
Solicitation of prospective clients has long been considered attorney
conduct that is highly improper, and even illegal.82 Because of the opportunity
for fraud, overreaching and undue influence on the part of an attorney who
seeks to solicit a client, solicitation is among the most mortal of sins the
attorney can commit.83 Nevertheless, solicitation is not prohibited when it
occurs in a situation where the attorney involved lacks the economic incentives
that are feared to lead to the evils that the prohibition against solicitation seeks
to prevent. 84 Therefore, Model Rule 7.3(a) does not prohibit solicitation of a
member of the attorney's family, and does not prohibit solicitation when the
attorney's pecuniary gain is not the motive for the solicitation.8 5
80. See Goff, supra note 4, at 298-306 (discussing, largely in the context of Borden v.
Borden, how the lack of economic interests of the legal services attorney distinguishes legal
services practice from for-profit practice); see also Donald E. Woody, Note, Professional
Responsibility - Conflicts of Interest Between Legal Aid Lawyers, 37 Mo. L. REV. 346
(1972) (discussing how the absence of economic interests distinguishes legal services practice
from for-profit practice).
81. See Michael B. Roche, Note, Ethical Problems Raised by the Neighborhood Law
Office, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 961 (1966) (discussing several unique aspects of the nature of
legal services practice, such as the prohibition against corporations practicing law, that create
ethical problems and are therefore treated differently for legal services than they are treated for
the for-profit practitioner).
82. See WOLFRAM, supra note 67, § 14.2.5 at 785-88.
83. Id., at § 14.2, pp. 787-88 (discussing two sides to solicitation of clients, one
involving potentially improper competitive motivations by the attorney, and the other involving
providing injured persons with important information as to how to seek redress for their
injuries); see also ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3
cmt. 1 (1992) (commentating on the potential for abuse inherent in the solicitation of clients).
84. MODEL RULE 7.3(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone
contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no
family or prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is
the lawyer's pecuniary gain."
While the Model Rules speak in terms of the attorney's motive for pecuniary gain as the
determining factor as to whether solicitation is prohibited and do not expressly exempt legal
services practice from the prohibition on solicitation, the Model Code in fact did expressly
exempt legal services practice. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
103(D).
85. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 7.3 cmt,
(1992) (stating that, "There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices
against an individual with whom the lawyer has a prior personal or professional relationship or
where the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
Consequently, the general prohibition in Model Rule 7.3(a) and the requirements of Model Rule
7.3(c) are not applicable in those situations.").
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The very different nature of the attorney's interests in each situation,
notably the apparent perception of a greater loyalty to a member of the
attorney's family and the lack of an economic interest, lessens the perceived
degree of risk to the interests of the client to an acceptable level. Though
decided on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, two solicitation decisions
of the Supreme Court, In re Primus,86 and NAACP v. Button,8 7 in dicta, have
discussed that the lack of economic interests on the part of a non-profit
provider of legal services who solicits persons for representation who are
unable to secure representation on their own exempts such situations from the
prohibition against solicitation.88 Consequently, situations involving an attorney
who lacks an economic interest in the matter are exempted from the solicitation
prohibition.8 9 Similar to the exception to the solicitation prohibition is the
exception to the prohibition against providing financial assistance to a client.
Though Model Rule 1.8(e) "continues the general common law prohibition
against advancing financial aid to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation" in order to prevent "encourag[ing] a client to pursue
lawsuits that might otherwise be forsaken," the rule contains an express
exception for attorneys representing indigent clients. 90 The exception of Model
Rule 1.8(e)(2) recognizes that to continue the prohibition for indigent persons
could operate to bar a client from pursuing litigation of her rights in a situation
where "there will be little unseemly competition among lawyers to outbid each
other for the right to represent parties."91 Therefore, in order to allow access
to the judicial process, the exception is created because the indigency of the
client may serve to lesson the economic incentives of the attorney to engage in
unprofessional conduct.92
86. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
87. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
88. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 423, 437 n.31 (1978) (overturning the professional
discipline of an attorney who, for purposes of providing legal representation at no charge, had
contacted a woman who had been sterilized as a condition of receiving medical assistance and
stating "... the ethical rules of the legal profession traditionally have recognized an exception
from any general ban on solicitation for offers of representation, without charge, extended to
individuals who may be unable to obtain legal assistance on their own." (citations omitted)); and
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 442-43 (1963) (holding Virginia statutes that prohibit
solicitation unconstitutional in declaratory action brought by the NAACP which sought to solicit
clients for school desegregation and stating, "There has been no showing of a serious danger
here of professionally reprehensible conflicts of interest which rules against solicitation
frequently seek to prevent. This is so partly because no monetary stakes are involved, and there
is no danger that the attorney will desert or subvert the paramount interests of his client to enrich
himself or an outside sponsor.")
89. For a discussion of permissible solicitation by not-for-profit providers of legal
services, see ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr, Rule 7.3 cmt. at
523-24 and 529-30; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 67, § 14.2 at 788-89 (analyzing
"permissible solicitation").
90. MODEL RULE 1.8(e)(2) provides, "a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr, Rule 1.8(e)(2) (1992).
91. WOLFRAM, supra note 67, § 9.2.3 at 508.
92. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 cmt.
at 143-146 (noting that exceptions exist to general prohibitions).
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D. No Money - No Problem: Except in Conflicts of Interest as
Applied to Legal Services Practice
In the context of solicitation and providing financial assistance to the
client, the lack of competing economic interests of the attorney involved serves
to transform a situation that is impermissible for the financially interested
attorney into a situation that is permissible for the attorney without a financial
interest. Nevertheless, the lack of economic interests of the legal services
attorney has been rejected as a justification for allowing representation in
conflict of interest situations. One case, Borden v. Borden,93 has been cited
most frequently for the rejection of the lack of pecuniary interests argument.9 4
Unfortunately, this case, which has served as the flash point for the discussion,
is a poor example of the conflict situations most frequently encountered by
legal services attorneys. Two factual quirks served to compel its holding that
the lack of economic interests does not allow a different application of conflict
principles for legal services practice, a holding whose underlying arguments
were neither fully presented or examined.
In Borden, the court rejected the argument that the different economic
structure of legal services practice warranted a finding that there was not an
impermissible conflict of interest for two attorneys from the same legal
services program to represent adverse parties in a divorce.95 The
Neighborhood Legal Services Program (NLSP), located in the District of
Columbia, represented Ms. Borden in an action seeking a divorce from Mr.
Borden. 96 Pursuant to a local ordinance that provided for court appointed
counsel in certain divorce actions, 97 the NLSP, on behalf of Ms. Borden, moved
for the appointment of counsel for Mr. Borden.98 The trial court, in a stroke of
one-upsmanship, the reason for which one can only hazard a guess,99 appointed
93. 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. 1971).
94. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 67, at § 7.6.5, pg. 406 (referring to Borden as the
"leading" case for the "general approach" of rejecting the argument that the lack of pecuniary
interests in legal services representation removes threats to confidentiality and loyalty present in
imputed conflicts when adverse parties each seek representation from the same legal services
organization); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1309 (1975).
But see People v. Wilkins, 268 N.E.2d 756, 757-58 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that the rule
imputing vicarious disqualification does not apply to a large, geographically separated, multi-
office, legal aid agency where it is unlikely that client information would be shared among
agency attorneys).
95. For discussion of Borden, see generally, Goff, supra note 4, at 298-305; Woody,
supra note 80, at 346-50.
96. Borden, 277 A.2d at 90.
97. Id.at90n.1.
98. Id. at90.
99. Being willing to hazard a guess, the author would say that because the applicable
ordinance involved provided for the compensation of appointed counsel to be "paid by the
parties as the court directs," and that the motion for appointment of counsel for Mr. Borden was
accompanied by a motion by Ms. Borden, proceeding in forma pauperis, to have applicable fees
waived, the trial court may have been seeking to avoid the appointment of an attorney whose
fees did not have a realistic chance of being paid by either party. Id. at 90. It is the author's
anecdotal observation that Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that a state may
not deny access to judicial remedies in divorce proceedings to persons unable to pay filing fees
due to indigency) was a bitter pill for some judges to swallow. One could guess that the trial
court appointed the NLSP to represent Mr. Borden in an effort to avoid the appointment of an
attorney who would not receive compensation from the parties and who would then turn to the
court for compensation. Therefore, the court turned to the organization established to provide
free legal services to do so for both parties.
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an attorney from the NLSP to represent Mr. Borden.100 In issuing the order of
appointment, the trial court relied upon its own previous ruling in which it
found that the absence of an economic relationship between attorney and client,
and between attorneys in the NLSP, among other unique aspects of legal
services practice, caused there to be no conflict of interest.10 '
What followed, is one of the two distinctive quirks about Borden that
should prevent the case from being considered dispositive of the issue of
whether the lack of an economic relationship between attorney and client, and
between attorneys in an office, allows for a different application of conflict of
interest principles in the context of legal services. The two NLSP attorneys,
each representing one of the adverse parties, moved to have the trial court's
order of appointment set aside arguing that they could not proceed in light of
the conflict created by the court's appointment. 02 Though the trial court denied
the motion to set aside the order of appointment,103 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the appointment of counsel for Mr.
Borden.104
Though Borden is most often cited for the proposition that the absence of
economic relationships and incentives in the free representation of indigents by
legal services attorneys does not alter the application of conflict of interest
principles, 05 it is unclear to what extent the court of appeals actually
considered the issue. Because the NLSP attorney representing Mr. Borden had
argued an "inability to represent the cause of their clients and remain faithful to
the Code of Professional Responsibility," 106 it would seem to have been
impossible for the court to have reached any result other than to reverse the
appointment of NSLP to represent Mr. Borden. To uphold the order of the trial
court would have forced an attorney to represent a client whom the attorney
had said he ethically could not represent. Representation should not go forward
when the attorney involved believes that professional obligations would be
compromised. 107
The appellate court did briefly mention and reject the argument that the
lack of economic incentives altered the nature of the interests that are
ordinarily in conflict when members of the same firm seek to represent adverse
parties.108 Yet, in so doing, the appellate court did not engage in any analysis of
100. Borden, 277 A.2d at 90. Borden thus involves the opposing adverse parties conflict
situation discussed supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
101. Id. at 90 ("Since, therefore, no economic conflict exists, no corporate interest is in
any way involved and no legal partnership as such has been disclosed it would appear that in fact
and objectively speaking there is no conflict of interest.") (quoting, McGee v. McGee, 98 Wash.
L. Rptr. 929 (1970).
102. Borden, 277 A.2d at 90.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 93. On appeal, Borden was consolidated with two other cases: In re Rabin,
276 A.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1971); and N.L.S.P. v. Ryan, 276 A.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
105. See supra note 94 for discussion of court and commentator reliance on Borden.
106. Borden, 277 A.2d at 90.
107. In order for representation to continue in light of a conflict of interest, Model Rules
1.7(a) and (b) both require that the lawyer "reasonably believes" that the client will not be
adversely affected. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a)(1) and Rule
1.7(b)(1) (1992).
108. Borden, 277 A.2d at 91 (stating that: "Lawyers who practice their profession side-
by-side, literally and figuratively, are subject to subtle influences that may well affect their
professional judgement and loyalty to their clients, even though they are not faced with the more
easily recognized conflicts of interest.").
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whether the interests involved were in fact altered by the attorney's lack of
economic interests, and the court was hard pressed to explicate the precise
nature of the interests that were in conflict when the attorneys representing the
adverse parties were from legal services. 109 The appellate court could only
manage to find "subtle influences that may well affect [the NSLP attorneys']
professional judgment,"110 and appeared to agree that the economic interests
that give rise to conflicts in private practice were absent."' Therefore, the
appellate court was not protecting any present threat to client confidences, but
was anticipating the possibility of a threat to attorney loyalty and zealous
representation.
In light of the fact that the NLSP attorneys involved represented to the
court that they could not proceed with representation of adverse parties, the
court would seem to have been unable to reach any other result. It is interesting
that the opinion does not state that the attorneys could not remain faithful to
their clients, but only could not remain faithful to the Code. One could wonder
whether the NLSP attorneys were responding to an ethical constraint they felt
was imposed upon them but did not affect their ability to zealously represent
their clients. 112
The second factual quirk of Borden perhaps served to make the court
unappreciative of the consequence of its decision to the legal services client.
The decision to find an impermissible conflict of interest most likely would not
have prevented Mr. Borden from obtaining representation, as there were other
avenues available to indigent persons in the District of Columbia to obtain free
representation." 3 If the case had occurred outside a large urban area, it is
doubtful that there would have been any alternatives available. As the survey
indicated, by far the most frequent consequence for the legal services client
who presents the office with a conflict situation is to not receive any
representation at all." 4 If the case had occurred outside of a large, urban area,
the court would have had to decide whether it should protect Mr. Borden from
a conflict of interest in his representation when the price was no representation
109. Commentators who have criticized the absence of pecuniary interests argument also
have failed to engage in any specific analysis of the interests. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 3, at
1130-31 (rejecting the lack of "economic impetus" argument without any analysis).
110. Borden, 277 A.2d at 91.
Commentators who have argued against any different application of conflict of interest
principles to legal services practice have had an equally difficult time explaining what interests
remain in conflict when-there are no economic interests. See Breger, supra note 3, at 1130-1131
(arguing that in the absence of a conflict of economic interests, interests dictated by human
nature, such as "ideological.. .personal or emotional interests" and "fighting spirit," are those that
are in conflict).
111. Borden, 277 A.2d at 91 ("...they are not faced with the more easily recognized
economic conflict of interest.").
112. It is unclear from the opinion what was the precise nature of the attorneys' reason for
stating that each could not proceed with representation, as the opinion only recites that the
attorneys involved, "have stated upon the record their inability to represent the cause of their
clients and remain faithful to the Code of Professional Responsibility." Borden v. Borden, 277
A.2d at 90.
As discussed, it was only the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that spoke in
terms of avoiding the "appearance of impropriety." See supra note 74.
113. Id. at 92 n.9 (noting that a panel of numerous lawyers was available to provide
representation without compensation). See, e.g., Goff, supra note 4, at 303-304 (discussing that
the finding of a conflict of interest in Borden did not result in a denial of any legal services due to
other programs available in the area to provide free legal services to the indigent).
114. See app. infra, question 23 at 626.
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at all.115 Nevertheless, the broad holding of Borden is that dual representation
is an impermissible conflict of interest in the context of legal services. 16
The crux of the issue, whether the lack of economic interests involved in
legal services representation changes the interests in the attorney client
relationship to a degree that warrants allowing representation in situations
where a private attorney would have an impermissible conflict of interest, for
the most part, was not examined in Borden or by the commentators who have
dismissed that argument." 7 Whereas in other situations where the attorney
lacks the customary economic incentives of the for-profit attorney that could
lead to dilution of loyalty to the client, such as solicitation and financial
assistance to the client, otherwise impermissible attorney conduct is allowed.
The same rationale should be extended to conflicts of interest. This becomes
apparent by examining the interests of the attorney who lacks the traditional
economic interests of the for-profit attorney.
The commentator who has written the most extensive work on the
application of conflict of interest principles to legal services practice has sought
to identify the non-economic interests of the legal services attorney that pose a
sufficient threat to the "attorney's independent judgment" so as to warrant the
finding of an impermissible conflict of interest even though pecuniary interests
are not present.1 8 Those interests are identified as "ideological interests in the
results obtained,"" 9 "personal and emotional interests in the results of lawsuits
they undertake,"1 20 and "the fighting spirit required in zealous
representation."'1' It is difficult to see how those attorney interests serve to
compromise the interests of the client in receiving zealous representation.
Instead, it would seem that they would all indicate the converse, for they speak
to an attorney's dedication to her client and to results obtained for her client,
rather than to a compromise of dedication to one's client. That is, unless the
attorney is opposed to the result which the client seeks-a situation not often
present for ideologically oriented legal services attorneys. Additionally, those
interests arguably are present in every attorney-client relationship. If those
results-oriented interests were sufficient in and of themselves to create a
conflict, representation would then be precluded in every situation where it is
possible that they are present. Therefore, the exceptions for non-economic
115. See infra notes 139-153 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the client's
interest in being able to secure representation from the only available source should be
considered in the calculus of when a conflict situation should preclude representation.
Apparently, the potential availability of other free counsel for Mr. Borden was relied
upon by the court in distinguishing NAACP v. Button. Borden, 277 A.2d at 92 ("Also we fail to
find in this case the extraordinary circumstances present in NAACP v. Button ... where legal
representation to vindicate constitutional rights of a group of citizens was simply unavailable
except in the form of group legal services...").
116. Borden, 277 A.2d at 92.
117. See supra notes 108-12 for a discussion of the deficiency of court and commentator
analysis of conflicts of interests in light of the unique lack of economic interests of the legal
services attorney.
118. Breger, supra note 3 at 1130-31 (acknowledging that economic motivations that give
rise to conflicts of interest are absent in legal services practice but arguing that other attorney
interests are present that threaten client interests).
119. Id. at 1131; see also, supra note 110, and accompanying text.




solicitation and financial assistance to the client could not be justified.22 An
attorney could never be allowed to enter a contract with her client, for the
attorney's contrary result oriented interest apparently would be self-serving
and, therefore, obviously detrimental to the client. 123
The Borden court took a different tack in attempting to identify the
"subtle influences"124 that affect the professional judgment of the legal services
attorney and create a conflict.125 It looked to the interpersonal relationships of
legal services attorneys who practice in the same office as having the potential
for affecting "their professional judgement and loyalty to their clients."126 This
could take several forms. Joint supervision of attorneys representing opposing
parties could pose a threat to client confidences.127 A senior attorney opposing ajunior attorney could cause the junior attorney to feel pressure to compromise
client interests in order to acquiesce to a senior colleague.128
While it can not be disputed that such influences on attorney interests
might be present, it does not necessarily follow that those influences are always
present to a degree that should give rise to an impermissible conflict of interest.
The threat to confidentiality by joint supervision can be easily alleviated by
adjusting supervisory responsibilities.129 The situation of pressure on the junior
attorney is more accurately couched in terms, not of a conflict of interests of
the adverse parties, but rather in terms of a limitation of the attorneys' ability
to provide representation due to their personal interests.130 In such case, the
disqualification is not required in every situation where adverse parties sought
representation from the same legal services organization. In the event that the
attorneys felt that their ability to provide representation would not be affected
by the "subtle influences" involved, disqualification would not be necessary.
122. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the how the lack of
economic interests by the attorney involved justifies the exceptions to otherwise impermissible
conduct. If the interests identified by Mr. Breger did in fact pose a threat to an attorney's
independent judgment so as to warrant a preclusion of representation in conflict situations,
representation would also have to be precluded in non-economic solicitation and financial
assistance situations, for those compromising interests would also be present.
123. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text for discussion of Model Rule 1.8 and
the accommodation of risk to client interests contemplated thereunder.
124. Borden, 277 A.2d at 91.
125. The court also acknowledged the absence of economic interests in legal services
practice that give rise to conflicts in for-profit practice. Id. at 91.
126. Id.
127. Legal services offices customarily have a senior attorney designated to have
supervisory responsibility over the legal work of the other attorneys in the office. See, e.g., id(describing the supervisory structure of legal services offices as "much like a law firm's senior
partner working with his associates.").
128. The court in Borden also identified among the "subtle influences" that "... attorneys
participate in office meetings and receive intra-office communications on substantive law,
litigation techniques and tactics, and office policy." Id. Such activities are more accurately
characterized as in-house continuing legal education programs on areas of substantive law that
are not specific to a particular client, rather than opportunities for breach of client confidences.
129. See Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 896-97 (Alaska 1979) (discussing that the
implementation of regulations that might be developed by a legal services that could segregate
client files, supervision and offices and would be sufficient to allow attorneys from the same
legal services office to represent opposing parties without a compromise to professional
responsibilities).
130. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt.
at 114-16 (2d ed. 1992) ("Paragraph (b): Conflicts that Affect the Quality of Representation")(discussing conflicts that affect the quality of representation, including "Lawyer's Own
Interests", "Lawyer's Personal Relationships" and "Influence of a Third Party").
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Therefore, the disqualification would not be per se, with the result that she who
gets to the legal services office first wins the prize of representation, while the
runner up is foreclosed from the only available source of representation.
The lack of economic interests on the part of the legal services attorney
should effect several ends. First, because the attorneys in an office have no
shared economic interests, a legal services office should not be considered a
"firm" for purposes of Model Rule 1.10(a). Whether a legal services office
constitutes a "firm" within the meaning of the rule has been largely considered
to be a question of proximity, in terms of offices and information. 131 This view
of the issue mostly addresses prevention of inadvertent disclosures of client
confidences. In that such situations can be warded against by means of screening
mechanisms, this is an unnecessarily onerous measure of whether an office
constitutes a "firm," particularly when it is considered that indigent persons are
denied access to their only source for legal representation. 132
Second, Model Rule 1.10(a) appears to speak to purposeful compromises
of client confidences rather than inadvertent disclosures. 133 The purpose could
be either innocent sharing of information in furtherance of common enterprise
or malevolent sharing for economic gain. Because physical separation would
seem to be an ineffective impediment to attorneys bent on malevolent conduct,
the physical separation test is considered superfluous in regard to for-profit
practice. 134 Therefore, Model Rule 1.10(a) utilizes the presumption of shared
information to impute the disqualification of one attorney to all who might be
predisposed to utilize that information. 135 The existence of that predisposition is
apparently measured by the "firm" concept, rooted in shared economic
interests. 136 Because the legal services attorney lacks shared economic interests,
the presumption of shared information is inappropriate. Therefore, instead of
basing imputation of conflict of interest on an inapplicable presumption that
131. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt.
at 180 (2d ed. 1992), "Definition of 'Firm"' (discussing whether legal services organizations
constitute a firm in terms of whether they are employed by the same "unit," but not giving any
definitional guidance as to what constitutes a unit); see also, ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professiornal Responsibility, Informal Op. 1309 (1975) (discussing whether legal services
offices may represent opposing sides in a lawsuit in terms of their possible "connections,"
physical, supervisory and informational).
See also Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 896 (Alaska 1979) (discussing that
representation of opposing parties by one legal services office would not compromise
professional ethics if procedures were enacted to ensure separation of "files, supervision and ...
offices").
132. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.10
cmt. at 187-8 (1992) (Screening to Avoid Disqualification) (discussing the use of screening
mechanisms to protect client confidences and avoid disqualifications).
133. See, ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.10
cmt. at 175 (1992) (stating that "[t]he rule is based upon the presumption that client confidences
are shared among law firm members....").
134. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.10
cmt. at 180 (1992) (stating that: 'The definition of a 'firm' adopted by Rule 1.10 includes the
separate branch offices of a traditional private firm...") (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir. 1978).
135. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.10
cmt. at 175 (1992) ("Legal Background: Reason for the Rule").
136. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.10
cmt. at 184 (1992) ("Lawyers in Continued Association Are Treated as One") (stating that all
lawyers in a firm are treated as one lawyer for conflict purposes).
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serves to deny the only source of services to indigent clients, imputation should
be based on a standard of actual prejudice to client interest.
Arguably, the situation of the sharing of information for a common
enterprise would seem to meet the test of a "firm," thereby imputing
disqualification. Nevertheless, the use of the presumption to guard against the
innocent sharing of information, particularly in the legal services context,
seems unnecessary. If information had in fact been shared that would prejudice
a client, the attorney who would be in a position to use that information to the
detriment of a client should disqualify herself.1 37 But there is no reason for
extending the disqualification beyond the attorney in actual possession of the
information. Additionally, if the sharing had occurred for no improper
purpose, must it be presumed that the attorney or attorneys involved would not
disqualify themselves? The presumption upon which Model Rule 1.9(a) is based
is similarly inapplicable to legal services practice. If an attorney is in possession
of confidential information about a former client who is now an adverse party
of a present client, that attorney should be relied upon to disqualify herself.138
Perhaps economic incentives make presumptions of prejudice necessary, but
when those incentives are absent, the presumptions serve little purpose,
particularly when balanced against client interests of securing representation.139
IV. No ATTORNEY - BIG PROBLEM: THE OVERLOOKED
INTEREST OF THE LEGAL SERVICES CLIENT
A. No Other Attorney Available = No Presumption of Prejudice
While the legal services client has the same interests as the client of the
for-profit attorney in the preservation of confidences and obtaining zealous
representation, the legal services client has an important additional interest that
is absent from the for-profit attorney-client relationship-obtaining
representation from the only available source.1 40 Whereas the non-indigent
client may simply find another attorney when a conflict prevents representation
by the attorney of choice, a conflict of interest most often serves to prevent the
137. This is the approach taken in Model Rule 1.10(b) which does not impose a
presumption-based disqualification in situations where a firm seeks to represent a party that has
interests adverse to a party represented by a former member of the firm. Instead, in order to
accommodate attorney mobility, Model Rule 1.10(b) bases disqualification upon the actual
possession of confidential information. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.10(b)(2) (1992).
138. Similar to Model Rule 1.10(b), Model Rule 1.9(b) also is not presumption based, but
instead looks to whether information is actually possessed in order to not unnecessarily hamper
lawyer mobility and the free choice of counsel. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9 cmt. at 161 ("Confidentiality") ("Paragraph (b) operates to
disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c)").
139. The absence of presumptions from Model Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(b) are, in large part,
an accommodation to attorney mobility in changing places of employment. See ABA
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9 cmt. at 160 ("[IThe rule
should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations, and taking on new
clients after having left a previous association"); id. at Rule 1.10 cmt. at 178 (discussing
"Mobility of Lawyers"). Certainly, availability of legal representation for the indigent is a far
greater concern than the employment prospects of attorneys.
140. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text discussing the client interests sought to
be protected by conflict of interest principles.
[Vol. 37:577
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
legal services client from obtaining any representation. 141 It is this consequence
that makes the legal services client unique. 142 Any realistic evaluation of
protecting the various interests involved in the attorney-client relationship must
take that interest into account as well. Otherwise, the rules of professional
conduct become punitive, rather than protective of the legal services client,
leaving the client without representation.
Conflict rules seek to balance "the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client,
the economic interests of the lawyer, and the public's interest in the availability
of legal services." 143 Because the absence of available counsel is the most
frequent consequence for the conflicted indigent client, the interest of the
indigent client in the availability of legal services is a much stronger
consideration than for any other client group. Nevertheless, this primary
interest of the legal services client is afforded less weight in the balancing than
that afforded to the interest of the indigent criminal defendant, or even than
that afforded the interest of the for-profit client in free choice of attorney and
the interest of lawyers themselves in occupational mobility. To account for the
interest of the legal services client in securing representation from the only
available source, disqualifying conflicts of interest should be found to exist only
where there is an actual prejudice to the client, and the notion of presumptions
of prejudice should be discarded from conflict analysis in the legal services
context. 144 Thus, representation would not unnecessarily be prevented.
141. See app. infra, questions 16-25A at 625-27. The survey inquired as to the frequency
that certain consequences occur for the client who presents the legal services office with a
conflict of interest. Question #23 "Client goes without representation," received a frequency
rating significantly higher than any of the other consequences inquired about. Only three of the
seventy-five responses to #23 indicated that the conflicted client "never" is left without
representation.
See also Aronson, supra note 4, at 856 (stating: "For wealthy clients, disqualification of
an attorney means hiring another. For indigent clients, however, disqualification of an entire
legal aid or defender organization has far more serious consequences."); Breger, supra note 3, at
1123 (noting: "Conflicted legal aid clients, however, are likely to go without legal assistance if a
legal aid office cannot represent them, as significant alternatives to legal aid and supplemental
modes of legal representation for indigents exist in only a few areas of the country."); Goff,
supra note 4, at 303 (contending: "Disqualification of an entire legal services program in a given
community from representing opposing parties to a divorce action can have the effect of
eliminating any legal assistance at all for one of the parties."); Woody, supra note 80, at 350
(arguing that "disqualification of an entire legal services program in a given community from
representing opposing parties to an action may eliminate the availability of the legal services for
one of the parties, making it more difficult for the poor to obtain legal counsel in civil matters"),
Developments-Conflicts of Interest, supra note 5 at 1402 (stating that "...conflicts rules may
have the perverse effect of saving individual pro bono clients from inadequate representation at
the cost of denying them representation altogether").
142. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text for the distinction between
representation of indigents by public defenders and legal services attorneys. See also supra note
21 for examples of jurisdictions that have found a state constitutional right to representation for
indigent clients in certain limited, non-criminal law areas.
143. ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7 cmt. at
109 (1992).
144. See Aronson, supra note 4, at 851-58 (discussing that considerations of public
policy, including, but not limited to, the unavailability of alternative counsel, warrant a limitation
in the application of the rule of vicarious disqualification to situations where actual, rather than
presumed prejudice exists).
It is interesting to note that Marshall Breger, who argued against any different application
of conflict principles for legal services, see supra notes 8, 50, & 63, made an argument that
sounds similar to that of discarding presumptions of prejudice. See Breger, supra note 3, at
1131 ("Care must be taken, however, to ensure that disqualifications are not compelled when
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In the context of the representation of indigent criminal defendants by
public defenders, some jurisdictions have discarded the notion of presumptions
in conflict of interest analysis when representation of co-defendants by
attorneys in the same office is undertaken. 45 This approach has been adopted
by examining the interests of the attorneys and clients involved to find that the
different interests involved warrant discarding the notion of presumptions in
conflict analysis. In direct analogy to the interests of the legal services attorney,
the interests of the public defender are devoid of pecuniary motivation.146 The
interests of the indigent criminal defendant, however, are not directly
analogous to those of the legal services client. If an attorney in a public
defender office has a conflict that is imputed to all the attorneys in the office,
the indigent criminal defendant is not left without representation. 147 The Sixth
Amendment guarantee of counsel necessitates that funds be expended to obtain
they would not further the goal of preserving this relationship [attorney/client]. The
extraordinary result of disqualification-the inability of the conflicted client to obtain legal
counsel-dictates that disqualifications be avoided unless absolutely essential to this goal. If the
fiduciary relationship would not be compromised by permitting dual or subsequent
representation, disqualification arguably should not be mandated.").
Though Mr. Breger recognizes the significance of the interest of the legal services client
in obtaining representation and that denial of representation should only occur when there is
prejudice to the attorney/client relationship, he fails to recognize the role played by presumptions
in determining when a conflict of interest is present. Therefore, he draws the line far too
narrowly as to the application of conflict principles to legal services.
145. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525, 527-29 (N.J. 1982) (holding that a public
defender office may represent co-defendants); People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d 157, 161-63(1I1. 1979) (finding that an office of a public defender is significantly different than a law firm so
as not to subject the public defender to the rule of per se disqualification); People v. Wilkins,
268 N.E.2d 756, 757-58 (N.Y. 1971) (holding there not to be a per se conflict of interest when
a non-profit provider of legal services to criminal defendants represents both a criminal
defendant and a witness against the defendant in an unrelated matter).
But see People v. Pinkins, 272 Cal.Rptr. 100, 104-07 (Ct.App. 5th. Dist. 1990)
(holding that public defenders and private practitioners should be held to the same conflict of
interest standard); Babb v. Edwards, 412 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 1982); Commonwealth v.
Westbrook, 400 A.2d 160, 162 (Pa. 1979) (treating two public defenders as two members of a
private firm); State v. Stevenson, 264 N.W.2d 848, 853 (Neb. 1978) (overturning a trial court's
order that a single attorney represent co-defendants who intended to implicate each other); Allen
v. District Court in and for Tenth Jud. Dist., 519 P.2d 351, 353 (Colo. 1974) (finding that an
attorney must withdraw in the face of a motion based on actual or potential conflict of interest);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1418 (1978) (informing a
public defender with offices in two cities that attorneys from the program may not represent co-
defendants with conflicting interests).
For discussion of the conflict of interest problems created by the representation of
criminal co-defendants and the implication for the indigent defendant, see John Stewart Greer,
Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional
Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978) (proposing a
prohibition on representing multiple defendants in criminal matters).
But see id. at 161 n.170 (discussing screening mechanisms that could be used by public
defender offices to mitigate the harshness on indigent defendants of a prohibition against
representation of indigent co-defendants).
146. See People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d at 160-62 (examining and contrasting the
interests of a public defender office to a private practice office and rejecting a per se rule of
disqualification for public defenders seeking to represent co-defendants); State v. Bell, 447 A.2d
at 528 (discussing that: "Public interest firms have no financial incentive in retaining the cases ofjoint defendants who might thereby be prejudiced.").
147. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1418
(1978) (discussing that a public defender office is disqualified from representing co-defendants




counsel outside of the conflicted office. 148 No such protection exists for the
legal services client who, most often, is denied the only available source of
representation if a conflict exists. 149 Nevertheless, the fact that the conflicted
criminal defendant may be faced with representation by an attorney from
outside the office of the public defender, who may not possess the same degree
of expertise in criminal defense as the public defender, has been considered a
factor of enough significance to abandon the use of presumptions in conflict
situations in order to accommodate client interests. 50 The result is no per se
disqualification of public defenders. Instead, the facts of each conflict situation
are examined to determine if the representation would result in actual prejudice
to the client.15'
For-profit representation also encompasses a shift from a presumption
based per se disqualification to an actual prejudice standard in order to
accommodate client interest in the choice of counsel and to accommodate
attorney interest in employment mobility. Thus, in both Model Rule 1.9 and
1.10 the per se disqualifications contained in paragraph (a) of each, become
disqualifications based upon actual prejudice in paragraph (b) if the conflict
situation is based upon a lawyer's prior association with a law firm.152
Representation is only precluded when confidential information is actually in
the possession of an attorney who stands in a position to use it to the prejudice
of a client interest. 53
Whereas the legal services attorney and the public defender possess the
same lack of economic interests, the interest of the legal services client in
obtaining representation is a greater interest than for the criminal defendant
due to the unavailability of alternative counsel. 154 In comparison to the
148. The cynic might suggest that it is this expenditure of public funds that is the
motivation for the abandonment of the presumption of prejudice. The finding that a conflict
situation does not unduly prejudice the criminal defendant therefore avoids the additional
expense of retaining outside counsel. Similarly, that same cynic might suggest that the rejection
of per se rule of imputed disqualification operates to negate claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel due to the existence of a conflict of interest where there has been no actual prejudice to
the criminal defendant.
149. See supra note 22 (discussing that the most frequent consequence for the indigent
client who presents the legal services office with a conflict of interest is to be left without any
source of representation).
150. See People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d at 162 ("In many instances the application of a
per se rule would require the appointment of counsel with virtually no experience in the trial of
criminal matters, thus raising, with justification, the question of competency of counsel."); State
v. Bell, 447 A.2d at 528 ("A per se rule requiring counsel from separate offices would therefore
needlessly deprive many defendants of competent local public defenders.").
151. See People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d at 163-69 (rejecting a presumption of per se
disqualification and examining the factual circumstances of three consolidated cases and finding
no impermissible conflict of interest); State v. Bell, 447 A.2d at 529-30 (rejecting a presumption
of per se disqualification and examining the factual circumstance of the situation to find no
impermissible conflict of interest).
152. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9 cmt.
at 160-61 (1992) ("Lawyers Moving between Firms"); and Rule 1.10 cmt. at 177-78("Countervailing Policy Considerations: Client's Right to Free Choice of Counsel").
153. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.9(b)(2) and Rule 1.10(b)(2)(1992).
154. In another context, the lack of alternative representation for legal services clients has
served to be a significant factor in determining the course of ethical behavior. See ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981) (discussing the ethical
obligations owed clients of legal services attorneys and offices in light of a closing of the offices
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accommodation for attorney mobility and free choice of counsel reflected in
Model Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(b), the interest of the legal services client is of far
greater social importance. Therefore, the abandonment of presumptions in
conflict analysis should be extended to all conflict occurrences in legal services
practice.
B. Allocation of Risk In Conflicts of Interest/Same Standard +
Different Profession = A Different Application
Critics of allowing legal services representation in conflict situations
where representation by the for-profit attorney would be prohibited have
argued that the legal services client deserves the same quality of representation
as is received by the paying client. 5 5 To them, removing presumptions from
the conflict of interest calculus would result in a lesser quality of
representation. 156 Though a standard of actual prejudice to the client would
provide protection to client interests from actual harm, the absence of
presumptions could be argued to expose the legal services client to a risk to her
interests that is greater than the risks to which the for-profit client is exposed.
For example, although attorney economic interests are absent, representation of
adverse parties by a single office does expose the client to risk from the "subtle
influences" discussed in Borden that can adversely affect zealous representation,
or, perhaps, even expose the client to risks of inadvertent or purposeful
disclosure of client confidences. 57 Therefore, it could be argued that the
existence of such risks to which the client would be exposed if presumptions of
prejudice were removed from legal services conflict analysis would cause the
legal services client to receive a lesser quality of representation. That argument
ignores the fact that the principles of professional ethics countenance the
acceptance of varying degrees of risk in order to accommodate a balancing of
the interests of attorney and client. Similarly, the interest of the legal services
client in obtaining representation, as well as the absence of attorney interests
that could lead to prejudice to the client, together should operate to countenance
whatever risk to the legal services client is inherent in discarding the
presumption of prejudice. An examination of the application of the Model Rules
to for-profit practice shows that an analogous risk to client interests is
commonly accepted.
One might glean from the previously cited definition of conflict of
interest, 58 that any time the interests of the attorney and client have the
potential for being adverse, or any time that a possible compromise of client
interests is present, a conflict of interest exists that mandates representation
should not proceed. 59 The definition speaks in terms of a conflict existing
due to a termination of funding and concluding that the absence of alternative counsel may make
it acceptable to take a new case where it otherwise would not be acceptable).
155. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 3, at 1127-31.
156. It is interesting to note that the courts that have abandoned presumptions in conflict
situations involving the public defender have done so in order to provide high quality
representation. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text (discussing non-economic interests
of the attorney that may serve to compromise client interests).
158. See supra noie 65 and accompanying text.
159. An oft quoted quip perhaps best describes the risk approach of seeking to avoid any
possibility of compromise to the client's interest: "[W]hen a practitioner is in doubt on an ethical
question, the best answer is usually No ..." John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D
Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 709 (1965).
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whenever interests are adverse "in any way," even though the representation of
the client is not affected. This is echoed throughout conflict of interest analysis,
as one encounters phrases using words such as "potential conflict,"'160 and
"insulation from...temptations, or...distractions."161 Nevertheless, the existence
of a conflict of interest does not always require that the attorney decline
representation.
Because conflict of interest doctrine seeks to balance the "duty of loyalty
to the client, the economic interests of the lawyer, and the public's interest in
the availability of legal services,"'162 representation is not prevented in every
situation that a conflict exists. 163 Instead, conflict doctrine countenances a
spectrum of risk to client interests that range from tolerating zero possibility of
risk to client interests, to allowing for representation when a significant risk to
client interests are present in order to accommodate the aforementioned
balancing. 64 The zero risk approach is reflected in Model Rule 1.10(a),16 5
which imputes the disqualification of any member of a firm to all members of
the firm, and Model Rule 1.9(a),166 which has been interpreted by courts to
contain a presumption, irrebuttable in some circuits, that information has been
received and will be used by the attorney to the prejudice of her former
client. 167
Yet, in order to accommodate "the economic interests of the lawyer," for
example, an obvious risk to the interests of the client is tolerated in Model Rule
160. ARONSON, supra note 4, at 809 (stating that "[w]hen a conflict or potential conflict
arises, a conscientious attorney usually faces three possible courses of action: [inform and obtain
consent, withdraw from representation of one client, withdraw from representation of both
clients]").
161. Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, supra note
6, at 1255 ("Confidentiality rules thus insulate lawyers from a set of temptations, or at least
distractions.").
162. ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7 cmt. at
109 (1992).
163. See WOLFRAM, supra note 67, § 7.1.3 at 318 (discussing countervailing principles
to an approach to conflicts of interest that would require disqualification "whenever the
possibility of an impairing these interests [loyalty and confidentiality] appeared.").
164. One commentator has discussed at length that a major conceptual inconsistency exists
in conflict of interest doctrine because of the spectrum of risks to client loyalty and
confidentiality contemplated in such doctrine. See McMunigal, supra note 56, at 837-42
(discussing three different risk formulations contemplated in present conflict doctrine that range
from acceptance of risk to client interests to zero tolerance of risk: first, "the resulting impairment
approach," that accepts risk to client interests other than that which would result in actual
impairment, id. at 837-39; second, "the risk avoidance approach," that avoids a certain degree of
risk to client interests, id. at 839-40; and third, "the appearance approach," that finds acceptable
no appearance of risk, id. at 840-42).
165. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.10
cmt. at 184 (discussing "the presumption that lawyers associated in a firm have access to
confidential information about each other's clients").
For cases rejecting the "safeguard" of screening the tainted attorney from the rest of the
firm by use of screening devices, see, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) (noting that despite all efforts to
separate attorneys, a reasonable possibility of compromise to client interests remained thereby
warranting that representation not proceed); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d
1263 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that "no matter what screens it sets up," a law firm may not
represent a client against a former client in a substantially related matter).
166. For a discussion of the role of presumptions in conflict of interest situations, see
Taskier & Casper, supra note 41.
167. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing the role of presumptions in
the conflict situations most frequently encountered by the legal services attorney).
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1.8(a) that allows for an attorney to enter into a business transaction with a
present client.' 68 In order to accommodate the public's interest in the
availability of legal services, Model Rule 1.7(a) and (b) allows for a client to
consent to representation by her attorney of choice even though an otherwise
disqualifying conflict is present.169 In order to accommodate attorney mobility,
Model Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(b) abandon the zero risk approach of Model Rules
1.9(a) and 1.10(a) in favor of an actual prejudice standard.
In these situations, a degree of risk to client interests in confidentiality
and zealous representation is accepted. Admittedly, the degree of risk involved
is tolerated because there are "safeguards" perceived to make the degree of risk
acceptable. For example, Model Rule 1.8 requires, as "mandatory
safeguards...that transactions between a lawyer and client be objectively fair to
the client and that the client be given a written explanation of the terms, have an
opportunity to consult independent counsel, and consent to the arrangement in
writing." 7 0 Model Rule 1.7(a) and (b) require, for a client to consent to a
conflict situation, that the attorney "reasonably believes" that the consented to
conflict will be not "adversely affect" the client.'71 Model Rules 1.9(b) and
1.10(b) require attorney disqualification when a client's confidential
information is known. The absence of such "safeguards," though the degree of
risk to the client is arguably no greater on its face,172 leads to a presumption of
prejudice to the client that requires per se disqualification in the case of Model
Rule 1.10(a), and an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice in Model Rule
1.9(a).
In essence, these safeguards amount to nothing more than a standard that
no actual prejudice to the client occur. Although risk to the "duty of loyalty to
the client" is inherent, it is tolerated to accommodate "the economic interests of
the lawyer, and the public's interest in the availability of legal services." A
similar accommodation for the unique, and more important interest of the legal
services client in "the availability of legal services" has not been struck.
As client interest in the free choice of counsel shifts risk allocation t6
allow for a client to consent to representation even though a direct conflict is
present, client interest in the legal services context of obtaining the only source
of representation, when combined with the absence of economic interest of the
legal services attorney, should operate to alter the allocation of risk from the
zero tolerance approach reflected in the application of presumptions to conflict
analysis to an approach of actual prejudice. Doing so does not place the legal
168. For a discussion of the risk tolerated in such situation, see, McMunigal Rethinking
Conflict of Interest, supra note 56, at 837-38 (discussing that "a pure resulting impairment
approach or actual impairment to lawyer functioning "seems to be reflected in the attorney
conflict of interest rules concerning business transactions between an attorney and a client.").
169. See WOLFRAM, supra note 67, §7.2.2 at 339-40 (discussing the use of consent in
conflict doctrine, as based, in part, upon "... the ground of personal autonomy of a client to
choose whatever champion the client feels is best suited to vindicate the client's legal
entitlements.").
170. ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 cmt. at
132 (1992).
171. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(a)(1) and 1.7(b)(1) (1992).
172. When a conflict is imputed to all members of a firm, many or all of whom may have
no knowledge of the situation that gives rise to the conflict, it is difficult to see how such
situation poses a greater threat to client interests than when an attorney enters a business
transaction with her own client about whom she knows confidential information and with whom
she has an established relationship of trust.
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services client in a position of receiving a lesser quality of representation.
Instead, it merely recognizes that the legal services client has similar, albeit
greater, interest in the availability of legal services than does the for-profit
client. Without giving proper weight to this interest of the legal services client,
the balance between the "duty of loyalty to the client, the economic interests of
the lawyer, and the public's interest in the availability of legal services," gets
struck inequitably, resulting in the unnecessary denial of representation for the
indigent client seeking legal services.
A change in conflict application for legal services clients from a
presumption based, zero-risk approach, to a standard of actual prejudice that is
devoid of presumptions and accepts some element of risk would have a
dramatic effect on the ability of the legal services client to obtain
representation. The two conflict situations most frequently encountered by legal
services attorneys would not cause a denial of representation for the conflicted
client unless actual prejudice were present. The imputation rule would not
presume that confidential client information will be available to, or shared by,
attorneys in the same office, and, therefore, would not prevent representation
of adverse parties by attorneys from the same office or program.173 Similarly,
the representation of a client against a former client in a substantially related
matter would not be prevented by the presumptions that confidential
information was obtained from the former client and will be used to
compromise that client's interests.174 An analogous actual prejudice standard is
contained in Model Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(b). If for-profit practitioners, who
have an economic interest in the outcome of cases may be trusted to disqualify
themselves when in possession of protected client information, should not legal
services attorneys, who lack any economic interest, be similarly entrusted?
Of course, one risk remains unaddressed, the risk to the profession of a
lack of public confidence when attorneys from the same office represent
adverse parties, or represent a party whose case is substantially related to that
of a former client who is now the adverse party. 175 The interest of the
173. See Aronson, supra note 4, at 851-58 (discussing developments in the application of
the rule of vicarious disqualification in both for-profit and legal services practice and concluding
that the nature of legal services practice warrants the application of a standard based upon actual
prejudice rather than vicarious disqualification based upon a presumption of prejudice).
See also Goff, supra note 4, at 302-03 (criticizing an inflexible approach to "imputed
knowledge" in both private practice and legal services practice); Woody, supra note 80, at 349-
50 (arguing for a relaxation of the rule of vicarious disqualification in legal services).
174. Some courts have rejected a per se, presumption-based disqualification of
representation adverse to that of a former client. See e.g., Black v. State of Missouri, 492 F.
Supp. 848, 873-74 (1980) (W.D. Mo. 1980) (refusing to disqualify plaintiffs' pro bono counsel
in school desegregation case who had previously represented the defendant school district,
absent a showing that actual prejudice would incur to defendant because to do so would be "a
triumph of regimented rule over reason" and "the alleged conflicts are more technical than
real.").
175. See supra notes 93-128 and accompanying text (discussing Borden v. Borden, 277
A.2d 89 (D.C. 1971)). After examining the lack of economic interests on the part of legal
services attorneys, and considering the argument that a different application of conflict principles
was therefore warranted, the court, as discussed, appeared unclear as to how to handle the
interests argument and resorted to a decision based, largely on the belief that it just didn't look
right for attorneys in the same office to represent opposing parties. ("We are reluctant ever to
make an exception from the professional norm for attorneys employed by the government or
others who provide legal representation without compensation from the client because then we
might encourage a misapprehension that the special nature of such representation justifies
departure from the profession's standards. We should always avoid any action that would give
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profession in its public perception, however, should not operate to be the
source of denial of the only source of representation available to a vulnerable
segment of society. Otherwise, the profession is sacrificing service to the public
to enhance its own appearance.176
V. DEFINING AND APPLYING AN ACTUAL PREJUDICE
STANDARD
A. Defining the Standard
With presumptions removed from conflict of interest analysis in legal
services in favor of a standard declining representation only when actual
prejudice is present, actual prejudice must be defined. A definition must address
both of the interests of the client sought to be protected by conflict of interest
principles - the interest in the preservation of client confidences and the
interest in receiving zealous representation. To address the protection of client
confidences, the legal services attorney should not proceed with representation
if she is in possession of prejudicial information about the adverse party that
was obtained from the adverse party in a confidential attorney-client
communication with an attorney in the same office or program.177 There are
two significant aspects to the test. The first is in possession of, as opposed to
access to prejudicial information. Though the information may be in a file in
another attorney's office or a central file room, it should not be presumed that
the attorney will avail herself of it. 178 Of course, care must be taken to prevent
inadvertent disclosures.1 79 The second, is that the information obtained in a
the appearance that government attorneys are 'legal Hessians' hired 'to do a job' rather than
attorneys at law. On the other hand, we should expect always from these attorneys
uncompromising adherence to the profession's established standards."). Id. at 92-93.
176. With apologies to Fernando, as portrayed by Billy Crystal, looking "marvelous,"
even for the legal profession, should not be more important than serving societal needs, or,
stated differently, it should not be better to look good, than to do good.
177. Of course, information imparted by the client to a member of an office who is not an
attorney is afforded the same degree of confidentiality as if it had been disclosed to an attorney.
ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 92 (2d ed.
1992) (discussing that the duty of confidentiality extends to nonlawyer members of the law
office).
178. But see ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9
cmt. at 181 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the preservation of client confidences in terms of access to
information and presumptions that accessible information will be utilized by the attorney to the
detriment of the client).
179. See Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 896-97 (Alaska 1979) (holding that there is a
state constitutional right to counsel in a child custody proceeding and that a legal services office
could represent both sides in such matter if regulations were in place to assure separation of
access to files, offices and supervision).
See also, Aronson, supra note 4, at 851-58 (discussing that public policy interests,
including allowing access to legal services by indigent clients, should allow for flexibility in the
application of conflict principles, particularly in the area of imputed disqualification, and
analyzing Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp, 581(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975) as an enlightened use of screening
mechanisms, to insulate various departments of a law firm in order to avoid imputed
disqualifications). See also, Developments in the Law - Conflicts of Interest and the LegalAid
Attorney, supra note 5, at 1408-13 (calling for increased use of screening mechanisms in the
poverty law context).
Use of screening mechanisms to ward against the exchange of client information with an
attorney who is considered "tainted" due to a conflict of interest is not, in and of itself, the
solution to the problem of conflicts of interest for the indigent client. As indicated by the
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confidential setting must be prejudicial. 80 How prejudice is defined is crucial.
In order to not unnecessarily prevent legal services clients from obtaining
representation, prejudice should be measured by content. Principles of
confidentiality should not be extended to every communication received by the
attorney.181 Though the communication took place in a confidential setting, if
the content is not subject to any privilege that otherwise would prevent its
disclosure through discovery, it should not be considered prejudicial so as to
create a conflict of interest.I8 2
For example, 18 3 Attorney One conducted an initial client interview of
Client One who seeks representation in a disability matter. The case is discussed
by all attorneys in the office at a case acceptance meeting. A decision is made
not to represent Client One. Thereafter, Client Two, the spouse of Client One
seeks representation in a family law matter in which Client One will be an
adverse'party. Attorney Two, who participated in the discussion of Client One's
case should not be presumed to be precluded from representing Client Two
pursuant to Model Rule 1.9(a), imputed to her by means of Model Rule
1.10(a).18 4
Even though Attorney Two may have gained information about Client
One, that information should not be considered prejudicial unless two factors
demographic information sought by the Survey, the majority of legal services programs are
comprised of fewer than five offices and the majority of offices employ fewer than five
attorneys. See app. infra, questions A and B, at 620. As indicated by an anecdotal response,
"We have 2 offices - a conflict for one attorney is a conflict for all - No attempt at "Chinese
Wall" - in small office with lots of communication - this is not feasible." Id. R67 at 620.
The screening device solution has not been discussed more extensively herein because of
its limited usefulness in small legal services office, as well as an additional reason. The
screening device continues recognition of the presumptions upon which imputed
disqualifications are based. Such screening mechanisms merely seek to prevent attorneys from
accessing the information that it is presumed they will access. It is the thesis of this article that
such presumptions are inapplicable to legal services practice.
180. Confidentiality as defined by Model Rule 1.6 is an .extremely broad concept
mandating that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client..."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Rule 1.6 (1992).
For discussion of the breadth of confidentiality contemplated by Model Rule 1.6, see
WOLFRAM, supra note 67, §§ 6.7.1, 6.7.2, 6.7.3 at 296-301. Professor Wolfram describes
Model Rule 1.6 as "prohibit[ing] a lawyer from revealing all client information, the good or
neutral along with the potentially harmful." Id. at 301.
181. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 230 (criticizing conflict of interest disqualifications
when an attorney seeks to represent an interest adverse to a former client, as well as criticizing
the overbreadth of the principle of confidentiality).
182. But see WOLFRAM, supra note 67, § 7.4.2 at 359-61 (discussing that the scope of
what should be protected by principles of confidentiality encompasses all communications
between attorney and client and should not be limited to that which is covered by an evidentiary
privilege); ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 cmt. at
90-91 (1992) ('Thus, the fiduciary obligation of confidentiality encompasses more than the
attorney-client privilege since it can include the client's confidences and secrets even if the same
information may be discoverable from other sources.") (citing Buntrock v. Buntrock, 419 So.
2d 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
183. For a discussion of a somewhat comparable example, though not in the context of
legal services representation, that reaches the opposite conclusion than that argued herein, see
WOLFRAM, supra note 67, § 7.4.2, at 359-66 (discussing, as an example, that a lawyer who
previously represented one spouse in a divorce should not subsequently represent the other
spouse in an action that seeks to set aside the divorce judgment).
184. It is the representation of the subsequent adverse party by a different attorney in the
same legal services office, as opposed to a single attorney representing both parties, that




are present. The information must be both prejudicial to Client One and not
otherwise subject to discovery. 8 5 Therefore, basic financial information
imparted to Attorney One in order to determine financial eligibility for legal
services would not cause actual prejudice for it would be otherwise
discoverable.18 6 But, information about Client One's alleged disability that may
be subject to a physician/patient privilege and would be prejudicial to Client
One in the family law matter, such as evidence of substance abuse that could
impact child custody or visitation issues, however would be considered to cause
actual prejudice if in possession of Attorney Two. Therefore, Attorney Two
must decline to represent Client Two if she is privy to such prejudicial
information.
As to the client interest in receiving zealous representation, the lack of
pecuniary interests of the legal services attorney alleviates concern that
compromise will occur in this regard to either of the clients. There is no
incentive to the legal services attorney to favor one client over the other in
expectation of future business and fees. 187 Additionally, as with any other
situation where the personal interests of the attorney prevent the attorney from
proceeding with representation, the legal services attorney must not proceed if
in fact she feels that the kind of "subtle influences" considered in Borden would
operate to compromise the quality of the representation provided the client. 188
If Attorney Two feels that the nature of her status in the office vis-a-vis
Attorney One, who previously represented Client One, will result in pressures
being brought upon her to represent Client Two less than zealously, an
impermissible conflict exists in the subsequent representation.18 9 Nevertheless,
representation of Client Two by another attorney in the office should not be
185. Professor Wolfram's example would not limit disqualification only to situations
where prejudicial information was communicated to the attorney. Instead, he argues for
disqualification when any information was communicated that would be considered confidential.
It is his position that "[there is public interest in assuring every client that communications to a
lawyer will not be used adversely in the lawyer's later work. Situations that create a realistic risk
that will occur are those in which the former-client conflict rules should require disqualification."
Id. at 360.
The factual difference in the examples of Professor Wolfram and that of this article
where one attorney represents a client in a matter adverse to a former client, as opposed to two
attorneys in the same office - alters the importance of the "public interest" factor. It would seem
a much less significant inhibitor on full and forthright client communication when it is a different
attorney in the office, who the client may not have ever even seen, who is representing the
subsequent adverse interest.
Additionally, Professor Wolfram discusses the confidentiality reason for attorney
disqualification as rooted in the prevention of the adverse use of client information. It is the
position of the author that it is only prejudicial information, as defined herein, that can be used
adversely. The concept of confidentiality in Model Rule 1.6 extends beyond adverse use and
past no use all the way to presumption of adverse use. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992).
186. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of eligibility
determinations and case acceptance criteria for legal services.
187. In discussing his example, Professor WOlfram considers lawyer disloyalty resulting
from economic self-interest as warranting attorney disqualification. See WOLFRAM, supra note
67, at 361.
188. See supra notes 107, 118-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
personal interests of the attorney giving rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest.
189. It is difficult to see how the "subtle influences" of Borden would be applicable in a
subsequent representation situation. It would be in the context of dual representation that such
would become a more realistic consideration. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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automatically precluded. If Attorney Three is not encumbered by the subtle
influences of Borden, she should be able to proceed with representation.
B. Applying the Standard
Before proceeding with the application of a conflict of interest standard
of actual prejudice, an initial determination should be made by the legal
services provider. That is, are there other available counsel for the client who
presents the office with a conflict of interest? If so, the client should be
referred to that counsel for representation. Because, for example, the risk
inherent in representation of adverse parties by attorneys in the same office
becomes acceptable only in light of the unique circumstance of the legal
services attorney being the attorney of last, or perhaps better stated, only
resort, that risk is not justified when it is not necessary to provide
representation from the only available source. Therefore, if other counsel is
available, either through another legal services program, or through a referral
mechanism to private counsel, representation by the alternative counsel must
take precedence in order to best serve client interests.1 90
If no alternate source of representation is available, two difficulties then
lie at the heart of applying a conflict of interest standard of actual prejudice
rather than a standard of presumption of prejudice. First, there is the timing of
when a determination must be made as to whether a conflict of interest prevents
representation. In the two most frequently encountered conflict situations,
representation of adverse parties and past client as opposing party, the
determination would be made most often at the most initial stage of
representation. The attorneys involved are then required to project into the
future what issues will arise that could result in prejudice to the client because
of information known to opposing counsel. 191 An inaccurate projection could
give rise to the disqualification of counsel in mid-litigation for both parties, as
opposed to turning away only one client.192
Consideration must also be given to the difficulty of the decision the
attorneys involved are being asked to make. It involves a choice between
engaging in a course of representation that could possibly be considered
190. See app. infra, questions 16-19 and 24-25A at 618-19 for a listing of various sources
from which alternate counsel is available for the legal services client who presents the office with
a conflict of interest and a rating of the relative frequency at which representation is obtained
from each. The most frequently availed source of representation for the conflicted client is from a
list, maintained by the legal services office, of private attorneys who have volunteered to provide
pro bono representation in conflict situations. See id. 16 at 618. Nevertheless, 29 of the 88
respondents indicated that clients "never" attain representation from such a conflicts list.
191. Courts that have adopted an actual prejudice standard in the context of representation
of co-defendants by public defenders of the same office have carefully reviewed the record to
determine whether a particular defendant was prejudiced by the representation received. Such a
hindsight review can be much more easily and accurately undertaken than can a projection at the
outset of representation. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d 157, 162-72 (Ill. 1979)
(examining the records of three consolidated cases, including transcripts of trial testimony, to
determine whether each defendant had been prejudiced). Determining what testimony had been is
a very different task than trying to determine what it will be.
192. See e.g. State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525, 535-37 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981) (Pashman, J.,
dissenting) (though agreeing with the majority "that public interest attorneys and private
attorneys should not automatically be treated the same way," disagreeing that it is not an
impermissible conflict of interest for attorneys from the same public defender office to represent
co-defendants, in large part, because conflicts may not be evident at the outset of representation
and discussing the unfortunate consequences of latter discovered conflicts).
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unethical, and denying representation to a client who has no other place to turn
for legal assistance. Not an easy decision. One commentator has argued that
when faced with such decision, the legal services attorney may feel an
obligation to provide services and will do so even though the quality of
representation is diminished.193 That argument is the opposite of reality. It is
the tendency of the legal services attorney, who chooses public interest work
out of sense of values rather than an interest in economic gain, to further those
values by striving strictly to adhere to the ethical standards of her profession. 194
Therefore, this tendency, if given too strict adherence, may result in an actual
prejudice standard not allowing access to representation to a significantly
increased number of legal services clients who would otherwise be denied
representation due to a conflict of interest.
Second, in both the adverse parties and past client as opposing party
situations, it must be determined how to assess whether actual prejudice would
be present without disclosing the confidential information that is sought to be
protected by conflict of interest principles. If one of two clients represented by
the same office wishes to challenge whether the opposing attorney has availed
herself of prejudicial information, a dilemma is faced of how to claim such
information is possessed without disclosing that which the client wishes to
remain confidential. 195
Any realistic attempt to invoke an actual prejudice approach to conflicts
of interest in legal services must address these difficulties. In the public
defender context, jurisdictions that have adopted an actual prejudice approach
to representation of co-defendants employ a mechanism to obtain judicial
approval at the outset of representation.196 In order for the profession to best
accommodate the legal needs of indigent persons, jurisdictions should adopt an
analogous procedure for civil actions involving parties represented by
193. Breger, supra note 3, at 1123, and 1127-31 and 1127 n.60 ("This tendency to give
all indigents some, although perhaps inadequate, service is premised both on philosophical
notions of equal treatment and subjective responses to the strain of legal aid practice.").
194. Responses to the Survey, both empirical and anecdotal, support this conclusion.Question 22 asked respondents to rate the frequency that the "[o]pposing party moves to
disqualify your office/program from representation of client due to conflict of interest." Of the 77
responses to that inquiry, 43 rated that it "never" happened, and 32 rated that it "rarely"
happened. The highest frequency rating, "occasionally," was assessed by only 2 respondents.
No respondents assessed to this situation the "frequently" or "most often" frequency. The
conclusion to be drawn is that initial determinations as to whether representation may proceed in
light of a conflict are conservatively made, resulting in few challenges. See app. infra, question
22 at 626.
A telling comment noted: "Ie degree of concern by staff attorneys is far higher than the
problem warrants. Staff have a higher awareness of conflict principles than many private
attorneys." Id. Comment 68 at 620.
195. See Taskier and Casper, supra, note 41, at 166-68 (discussing the dilemma a court
faces in determining whether an opposing attorney possesses confidential information in a
manner that does not require disclosure of the information sought to be protected).
196. See, e.g., N.J. Rev. Crim. Pract. 3:8-2. Joint Representation:
No attorney or law firm shall be permitted to enter an appearance for or represent
more than one defendant in a multi-defendant indictment without securing, upon
motion brought before the Assignment Judge or his designee upon notice to the
prosecuting attorney, permission of the court.
Such motion shall be made in the presence of the defendants sought to be
represented as early as practicable in the proceedings so as to avoid delay of the




providers of legal services. If an action is pending at the time the question of
conflict occurs, a motion seeking judicial approval of the representation can be
brought.
Of course, the majority of civil actions in which parties seek
representation do not involve litigation. 197 Therefore, there is not necessarily a
tribunal with jurisdiction over the interested parties or the subject matter of
their dispute which can make the determination whether a conflicts situation
involves actual prejudice that should prohibit representation. The legal services
office itself could make the determination, much like the common practice in a
large, for-profit firm confronted with a potential conflict of interest. 198 Two
problems are inherent in that approach. First, the impartiality of such a
determination could be subject to question, especially in light of the nature of
the decision involved. The office must determine not just whether a conflict
exists as does the for-profit office, but the legal services office must decide
whether a conflict is prejudicial. Second, the noted tendency of the legal
services office to be overzealous in its adherence to the ethical mandates of the
profession might skew the determination towards non-representation. 199
Both problems speak to the need for an independent entity to provide a
review equivalent to that of a judicial tribunal. A variety of persons might be
looked to for the performance of this function. A member of the local bar
wishing to perform this function as pro bono work could be asked by the legal
services office,2 00 as could a lawyer member of the legal services program
governing body. 20 1 Alternatively, each program maintains a grievance
committee for the purpose of resolving client dissatisfactions.20 2 The grievance
committee could perform the conflict review. The mechanics do not seem
insurmountable. The independent reviewer would have the authority to examine
the proposed representation for approval or rejection. Attorney concerns of
maintaining ethical standards are alleviated by obtaining a ruling as to the
presence or absence of prejudice in the proposed representation. Client
concerns of not having to disclose confidential information in order to
challenge a proposed representation can be addressed by in camera inspection
of the information alleged to be in the possession of opposing counsel.
In the event it is determined that a conflict does not actually prejudice the
clients involved and that representation may proceed, the clients, of course,
197. See LEGAL SERV. CORP. ANN. REP. 9 (1992) (discussing that of the cases in which
representation is undertaken, 36% are situations where the client receives "counsel," 22% are
situations where the client receives "brief service," and 9% are situations that result in "court
decision").
198. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 301: 1003-04
(discussing "screening" of cases prior to acceptance of representation).
199. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. Caseload pressures may provide an
added incentive for the legal services office to find an impermissible conflict of interest. It is
easier to deny services from the "last lawyer in town" on the basis of external rules of the
profession than on limited internal resources.
200. See 45 C.F.R. § 1614 (1994) (mandating the expenditure of 12.5% of a program's
annual LSC allocation on private attorney involvement in the delivery of legal services).
201. See 45 C.F.R. § 1607 (1994) (mandating the establishment by each recipient of LSC
funds of a governing body comprised of practicing attorneys, eligible clients and nonattorneys).
202. See 45 C.F.R. § 1621 (1994) (providing for the establishment of grievance
committees by each program to resolve client dissatisfactions and insure client accountability).
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would need to consent to the representation. 203 Representation would not be
provided for a client who refused to consent to a conflict determined to be non-
prejudicial by the independent reviewer. Otherwise, that client would be able to
win the race to the door of the "last lawyer in town" simply by refusing to give
consent.
In conducting the review proceeding, a different mindset is required
when considering whether an impermissible conflict of interest exists in legal
services. Conflicts are approached in for-profit representation from an attitude
of "[w]hen...in doubt,...the best answer is usually No.....204 The question
considered is: Is there any possible reason why representation should be
declined? For legal services practice, because of the unique position of the
client in not having anywhere else to turn for representation, the conflict
approach should be different. The question should be: Is there a way that
representation can be provided without actual prejudice to the parties involved?
The economic interests of the for-profit attorney may serve to cause any error
in conflict inquiry to be on the side of inclusion, thereby justifying a very
cautious approach. The absence of economic interests of the legal services
attorney nullifies the rationale for such approach. Therefore, in light of the
dire consequence to the client, representation should be prohibited only when
necessary to protect the client's interests.
More importantly, the presumption of prejudice to the client should be
supplanted by a presumption of professional integrity. Presumptions of
prejudice assume a very dim view of human nature. Perhaps an attorney's
pecuniary motivations warrant that view. The legal services attorney, however,
should be counted on to decline representation when she in possession of
confidential information that would be prejudicial to the opposing party.
Further, the legal services attorney should be trusted to be able to refrain from
secreting confidential information about an opposing party from the files of
another attorney in the same office. It is such presumptions of integrity that
should lie at the heart of standards of professional ethics, particularly at a time
when the profession is seeking to regain public respect and reestablish a sense
of civility in practice,205 while at the same time concerning itself with the
unmet legal need of indigent persons.2 06 If not, the profession is saying to the
public that we do not trust ourselves enough to provide professional services
for the less fortunate.
203. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.7(b) (1992)
(mandating client consent when representation proceeds when a conflict of interest is present).
204. Frank, supra note 158, at 709.
205. See, e.g., Marvin E. Aspen, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON CIVILITY OF
THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (1992) (reporting on the look of civility
demonstrated by members of the profession); R. William Idle III., Regaining the Public's
Confidence: Legal Profession Must Respond to Image Problems, Erosion of Trust, 79 A.B.A J.
8 (Nov. 1993) (advocating changes in the legal profession in order to bring a halt to the erosion
of the public's trust).





Conflict of interest principles were developed to serve two ends. First,
conflict of interest principles protect the client by both assuring zealous
representation from an attorney whose interests are not divided and by
protecting the client from disclosure of client confidences. Second, conflict of
interest principles seek to maintain a perception to the public of the integrity of
the profession.
Analysis of conflict of interest situations in the legal services context has
not correctly identified that the interests involved that may conflict are
different than those involved in for-profit representation. The legal services
attorney lacks the economic incentives to compromise client interests that
conflict rules seek to protect. The most important interest of the legal services
client, to be able to secure representation from the only available source, is a
factor that has been left out of the calculus of previous considerations of
whether representation must be declined in legal services practice due to a
perceived conflict of interest.
Because the interests involved are different, the risks of compromise to
client interests that are sought to be protected are also different. Therefore, the
presumptions of prejudice in conflict analysis and application in the context of
for-profit representation are neither necessary nor applicable in the legal
services context. Only where the client's interests are actually compromised, as
opposed to situations where representation may not proceed due to factors that
are considered to provide incentive for a compromise of client interests, should
representation be declined. To decline or deny representation for reasons other
than actual prejudice to the client is to grossly ignore the fundamental
importance of receiving some representation versus none. Further, to decline
representation in order to maintain a perception of integrity of the profession,
is to sacrifice the interests of the client on the altar of putting forth a good
public face. Such a decision would appear to itself be motivated by a conflict of
interest that exists between the profession as a whole and the individual client.
Also, it sacrifices client needs of a specific population for the bettering of
general goals of the profession. Surely, the interest of the profession must be
made subservient to the interests of the clients that the profession seeks to serve.
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SURVEY OF CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN LEGAL SERVICES2
0 7
For each of the following, choose
one response that best describes
your office and the community in
which it is located
A. How many offices are in your






B. What is the number of attorneys in






C. What is the size of the community in
which your office is located?(Check
one only)
(6) 500,000+
(17) 100,000 - 500,000
(17) 50,000 - 100,000
(25) 10,000 - 50,000
(13) less than 10,000
207. The survey document is that
which was used to survey legal services
providers in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
with the following alterations. The number
of responses to a particular category are
indicated in parentheses. Questions 1D, 1A,
1P, 2D, 3A, 6D, 7D, 9D, 12A, 12B, 12C,
16A, 24, 25, and 25A represent
compilations of like responses that
respondents described as "other." Relevant
narrative comments are included. The
number preceding each comment is a
reference number only. The numbers in
brackets represent an average of the
responses. The survey methodology is
discussed at notes 24-32.
D. Which best describes the nature of
your program? (Check one only)
(75) General legal services
practice
(3) Practice limited to one
substantive area





For each of the following, please
provide two estimations.
First, of the conflicts that you encounter,
please estimate the comparative frequency
with which your program or office is
confronted with each of the following
situations by circling a numerical value of 1
- 5, ranging from "never" occurs to "most
often" occurs.
This conflict occurs:
1 ------ 2 -------- 3 -- 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
Second, on the space marked "actual
prejudice," using the same scale as above,
please estimate the frequency that the
conflict, when it occurs, involves a risk of
actual prejudice, such as privileged
information available to the office or
attorney with the conflict that would be
detrimental to the client who creates the
conflict (as opposed to a conflict that is
based upon a per se rule of disqualification,
but that presents no actual risk of prejudice
to the client).
For example: client 1 completes an
application for services and is determined to
be ineligible due to excess income. Client 2,
who is the spouse of client 1, seeks
representation in a divorce. There is no
information on the application of client 1
that would not be discoverable. Therefore,
the conflict would be considered to not
present an actual risk of prejudice to client
1.
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Actual prejudice is involved:
1 - 2 - 3-------- 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
1. The opposing party of the
client/applicant is represented by
your program. (Example: office
represents wife in a family law
matter, and husband then seeks
representation.)
This conflict occurs: [3.519]
1 ------ 2 -------3 ----- 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(1) (6) (35) (22) (13)
Actual prejudice is involved: [3.351]
1 ---- 2------ 3 ------ -4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(3) (21) (21) (10) (22)
ID. Supplemental response determined
to be the same conflict situation as
described in 1, though respondent
has described it using a different
factual setting.
This conflict occurs: [3.400]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ---.- 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (1) (2) (I) (1)
Actual prejudice is involved: [4.200]
1 ------ 2 -------3 ---- 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (0) (1) (2) (2)
IA. The opposing party of the
client/applicant and the Client both
seek representation at the same time.
(Example: husband and wife seek
representation in a family law
matter.)
This conflict occurs: [3.667]
1 ------ -------3 ---- 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (1) (0) (0) (2)
Actual prejudice is involved: [4.333]
1 ------ 2 -------3 --- 4- - 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (0) (1) (0) (2)
IP. The opposing party of the
client/applicant seeks representation
from the program's Private Attorney
Involvement Program (PAI
Program) in the same matter in
which the Client is being
represented. (Example: office
represents wife in a family law
matter, and husband seeks
representation from PAI Program.)
This conflict occurs: [3.750]
1 --------------- 3 - -4------ 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (0) (2) (1) (1)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.750]
1 ------2 -------3 ---- 4- - 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (2) (1) (1) (0)
2. The opposing party of the
client/applicant is or was represented
by your program in a different but
substantially related matter.
(Example: office previously
represented husband in an SSI case,
and wife now seeks representation
in a family law matter.)
This conflict occurs: [3.325]
1 ------2 -------3 ---- 4- -. 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (11) (37) (22) (7)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.805]
1 ------ 2 -------3 ----- 4------ 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(3) (30) (28) (11) (5)
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2D. Supplemental response determined
to be the same conflict situation as
described in 2, though respondent
has described it using a different
factual setting.
This conflict occurs: [3.286]
1 ------------ --4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (1) (3) (3) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [3.167]
1 ------ 2---------- 3 - - -4 - -5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (1) (3) (2) (0)
3. A present client will be called, or
may be called, as an adverse witness
to another client in an unrelated
matter. (Example: Client I is being
represented in an AFDC matter and
will be an adverse witness to Client
2 who faces eviction.)
This conflict occurs: [2.260]
1 ------ .... 3 ------ 4 .--- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(8) (45) (21) (2) (1)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.480]
1 ------ 2 .... 3 ------ 4 .--- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(12) (32) (19) (7) (5)
3A. A past client will be called, or may
be called, as an adverse witness to
another client in an unrelated matter.
(Example: Client 1 previously was
represented in an AFDC matter and
will be an adverse witness to Client
2 who faces eviction.)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.480]
1 ------ .... 3 ------ 4 -- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (2) (2) (0) (1)
Actual prejudice is involved: [3.600]
1 ------ 2 .... 3 ------ 4 -- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (1) (l) (2) (l)
4. The opposing party of the
client/applicant is represented by an
attorney who is the spouse or
significant other of an attorney in
your office.
This conflict occurs: [1.390]
1 - --2 ------- 3 ---- 4 ..... 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(58) (10) (8) (0) (1)
Actual prejudice is involved: [1.577]
1 --------------- 3 - -4------5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(50) ( 1) (4) (2) (4)
5. The opposing party of the
client/applicant is represented by an
attorney with whom an attorney in
your program previously practiced.
This conflict occurs: [1.714]
1 --------------- 3 - -4----- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(34) (33) (8) (2) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [1.557]
1 ------ 2 --------- 3 -4----- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(40) (24) (4) (1) (1)
6. Two clients seek representation in
regard to a related matter in which
their interests have the possibility of
becoming adverse. (Example: Client
1 and Client 2 face eviction for an
alleged incident involving a child of
each, and a potential defense is to
claim the other's child was the
instigator.)
This conflict occurs: [2.831]
1 -------------- 3 --- 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(2) (24) (37) (13) (1)
Actual prejudice is involved: [3.026]
1 ------ 2 -------3 ---- 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(6) (18) (26) (22) (5)
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6D. Supplemental response determined
to be the same conflict situation as
described in 6, though respondent
has described it using a different
factual setting.
This conflict occurs: [3.000]
1 ------ -------3 ----- 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (1) (0) (1) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.000]
1 ------ 2---------- 3 .... 4 - -5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (1) (0) (0) (i)
7. Client seeks representation in regard
to a matter that requires taking a
position that is adverse to the
interests of a community group
which is a client. (Example: Client is
facing eviction for alleged drug use,
and office represents a tenants'
organization that is actively working
to reduce drug usage in the
development in which Client lives.)
This conflict occurs: [2.000],
1 ------ -------3 ----- 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(27) (28) (17) (5) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.437]
1 ---- 2 ------ 3 ------ -4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(22) (19) (13) (11) (6)
7D. Supplemental response determined
to be the same conflict situation as
described in 7, though respondent
has described it using a different
factual setting.
This conflict occurs: [3.000]
1 ------ 2 --------- 3 -- -4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (0) (1) (0) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [4.000]
1 ------... --------- 3 -- -4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (0) (0) (1) (0)
8. Client seeks representation in regard
to a matter that conflicts with
attorney's personal interests.
(Example: Client seeks
representation to obtain a divorce
and the religious beliefs of the
attorney do not accept divorce.)
This conflict occurs: [2.000]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 - -4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(26) (31) (15) (4) (1)
Actual prejudice is involved: [1.486]
1 ------ 2 -------3 ---- 4- ..... 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(47) (19) (7) (1) (0)
9. Client seeks representation in regard
to a matter that conflicts with the
interests of the general client
population. (Example:
Representation of Client would
involve raising a unique, though
meritorious issue, and attorney
prefers to forgo such argument in
favor of awaiting a later client whose
case presents the issue in a better
factual context.)
This conflict occurs: [2.442]
1 ------2 -------3 ---- 4- - 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(13) (25) (32) (6) (1)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.342]
1 ------ 2 -------3 ---- 4- - 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(17) (30) (18) (8) (3)
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9D. Supplemental response determined
to be the same conflict situation as
described in 9, though respondent
has described it using a different
factual setting.
This conflict occurs: [3.000]
1 ------ -------3 ----- 4------ 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (0) (1) (0) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [4.000]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 54 .... 
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (0) (0) (1) (0)
Please describe any other conflict
situations that you have encountered
and provide the same estimations as
you provided above. 20 8
10. The opposing party of the
client/applicant previously was represented
by a present attorney in your office during
previous employment. (Example: Client
seeks representation in an eviction from a
housing development that attorney in office
represented in previous employment).
This conflict occurs: [2.600]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (3) (1) (I) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [3.000]
1 ------ 2---------- 3 -4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (2) (2) (0) (1)
11. An attorney or her family member
has a financial interest that is adverse
to the Client. (Example: Client seeks
representation in an eviction action
from a development in which the
spouse of an attorney in the office
has an ownership interest).
This conflict occurs: [3.000]
1 ------ 2 -------3 ---- 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (I) (I) (I) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.667]
1 --.. --2 ----- 3 - . -4 -.-- -5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(D (1) (0) (0) (1)
12. The office has a contractual
relationship with the opposing party
of the Client. (Example: Client seeks
representation in a collection action
brought by a health care provider,
and office has a contract with that
provider to provide legal services to
other patients relative to their
obtaining medical assistance
payments).
This conflict occurs: [3.000]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (1) (0) (1) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [3.500]
1 ------------ 3 ------ 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (1) (0) (0) (1)
12A. The opposing party of the Client is
represented by an attorney who
previously worked in the legal
services office. (Example: Client
seeks representation in an eviction
action, and landlord is represented
by attorney who formerly worked in
legal services office).
This conflict occurs: [4.000]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (0) (0) (1) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.000]
1 ------ 2 ------.. 3----- -4 -5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (I) (0) (0) (1)
208. For a discussion of the
methodology used in this section, see supra
note 28.
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12B. Person comes to office on behalf of
eligible client for the purpose of
obtaining representation for that
person and has an interest adverse to
that of the client on whose behalf the
persons has come to office.
(Example: Adult child comes to
office on behalf of parent who is
allegedly incapacitated and in need
of appointment of a guardian, but
parent opposes the appointment of a
guardian).
This conflict occurs: [4.000]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (0) (0) (1) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [2.000]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (1) (0) (0) '(o)
12C. Client seeks representation in regard
to a matter that previously was
subject of mediation in which office
acted as mediator. (Example: Office
mediates disputes between local
housing authority and tenants. Client
has dispute with housing authority
that was mediated by office. Client
now seeks representation in same
dispute).
This conflict occurs: [3.000]
I ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (0) (1) (0) (0)
Actual prejudice is involved: [4.000]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 -----. 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (0) (0) (1) (0)
When conflict situations have
occurred in your program, please
estimate the frequency of the
following.
13. The conflict involves only one
attorney in one office.
This occurs: [2.947]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4 ------ 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(8) (23) (20) (15) (10)
14. The conflict is imputed between
attorneys within one office in your
program.
This occurs: [3.145]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4 ------ 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(10) (14) (17) (25) (10)
15. The conflict is imputed between
attorneys in two different offices in your
program.
This occurs: [2.781]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4. -4 - 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(7) (25) (24) (11) (6)
In situations in which your program
has not been able to proceed with
representation due to a conflict of
interest, please estimate the
frequency with which the following
have occurred.
16. Client obtains representation from a
private attorney on a conflicts list maintained
by your office or program.
This occurs: [2.377]
1 ------------ 3 ------ 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(29) (13) (15) (17) (3)
16A. Client obtains representation from a
private attorney on a conflicts list
maintained by local bar association.
This occurs: [5.000]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(0) (0) (0) (0) (2)
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17. Client obtains representation from a
private attorney who is not on a
conflicts list maintained by your
office or program but who agrees to
provide pro bono representation.
This occurs: [2.197]
1 ------ 2---------- 3 - -- 4 - -5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(15) (38) (17) (5) (1)
18. Client obtains representation from an
attorney appointed by a judicial
tribunal.
This occurs: [1.558]
1 ------ -------3 ---- 4 ..... 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(43) (26) (7) () (0)
19. Client obtains representation from an
attorney appointed by an
administrative tribunal.
This occurs: [1.208]
1 ------ 2 ------ 3 ------ -4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(61) (16) (0) (0) (0)
20. A "Chinese Wall" is built around
attorney with conflict in order to
provide representation to client.
This occurs: [1.487]
1 ------ -------3 --- -4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(47) (22) (6) (1) (0)
21. Client consents to the conflict and is
represented.
This occurs: [2.312]
1 ------ 2 -------- 3 - -4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(10) (35) (31) (0) (1)
22. Opposing party moves to disqualify
your office/ program from
representation of client due to
conflict of interest.
This occurs: [1.468]
1 ------ 2 -------3 ---- 4 --- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often
(43) (32) (2) (0) (0)
23. Client goes without representation.
This occurs: [3.697]
1 ------2 -------3 ----- 4------ 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(3) (9) (19) (22) (23)
Please describe any other results
that have occurred when your
program has encountered a conflict
and provide the same estimations as
you provided above.
24. Client obtains representation from a
neighboring, different legal services
program that provides free legal
services to indigent persons.
This occurs: [3.500]
1 ------2 -------- 3 - -4------ 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (1) (3) (3) (1)
25. Client obtains representation from a
private, for-profit attorney whom the
client agrees to compensate for the
services provided.
This occurs: [4.000]
1 ------ 2 -------- 3 --- 4 ---- 5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (0) (t) (1) (t)
25A. Client obtains representation from a
private attorney who is paid by the
office with the conflict utilizing PAI
Program funds.
This occurs: [4.500]
1 ------------ 3 --------- 4 - -5
never rarely occasionally frequently most
often(0) (0) (0) (t7 )
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Please feel free to make comments: (The following comments were gleaned from
all that were received. They are included herein because they address the issues discussed in the
article. The number in the left-hand margin is for reference purposes. All of the comments
received are on file with the author.)
#17 Our program's lack of adequate resources and the lack of any requirement on the private
bar to engage in pro bono representation results in a very substantial number of low
income households being denied any free legal services due to conflicts of interest we
have which prevent our assisting the client.
#37 I obtained an opinion from the Ethics committee which in domestic cases allows my
program under circumstances to refer both parties to PAI attorneys. But there are
inherent problems with this system.
#38 Given the tiny community here, I often encounter conflicts that leave me frustrated
because although a legal "conflict' exists no real conflict does. (Emphasis as in original).
#41 I appreciate the conflict problems. However, I am very much opposed to creating a
different ethical standard for legal services and non legal services clients.
#42 I am very interested in the results of your survey. [Our office] has only two attorneys
and we have very few attorneys in the community as a whole. Those attorneys are
overloaded with pro bono cases.
#49 Conflict of interest is a constant problem that would most likely be made even worse by
the application of different standards to legal services.
#50 We really don't reject many cases based on conflicts - most common is the race to the
phone between fighting spouses.
#55 I feel the most troublesome potential conflicts are when we have a former client as the
potential opposing party. It is hard to know where to draw the line in terms of Rule
1.9(a)(2) at times.
#66 As indicated in #16, this is our Program's Solution to some of these problems, namely
using PBI $ to pay local attorneys in conflict situations. I get the impression that it is a
unique approach, but perhaps not. PBI requests are approved by Executive Director on a
case-by-case basis, and is available only for as long as our PBI 12 1/2% money lasts.
PBI funds have been known to run out as early as June, but they usually last well into
the Fall/early Winter.
#67 We have 2 offices - a conflict for one attorney is a conflict for all - No attempt at
"Chinese Wall" - in small office with lots of communication this is not feasible.
#68 The degree of concern by staff attorneys is far higher than the problem warrants. Staff
have a higher awareness, of conflict than many private attorneys.
#71 We most often see conflict in the housing area because of the nature of our practice is a
neighborhood office. Although we have 3 offices in [our program], our Family Law
Conflicts have been minimized by having all of our Family Law Cases handled by our
Family Law part which is only one office. The Juvenile/Family conflicts are very rare
occurrences. The largest dilemma is the neighborhood group interest in drug free and
safe environment compared to an individuals interest in sharing their housing where
drugs are alleged, but there is no proof and may be prejudice.
6271995]
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#73 Our program has wrestled with the matter of conflicts again and again. I'm looking
forward to reading you article. In Iowa, there is an opinion which indicates LSCI can
destroy files and intakes after 5 years, and no longer count them as conflicts, so long as
no attorney actually recalls items creating a conflict. Please let me know if you'd like a
copy.
